Ghana's GoldBod Crisis: Parliament Demands Answers as $1.7BN Loss Looms and Public Debate Rages
A major controversy surrounds Ghana's GoldBod and the Bank of Ghana's Domestic Gold Purchase Programme, with the Minority in Parliament pushing for an investigation into a reported $1.7 billion loss. GoldBod claims significant profits, sparking a debate clarified by the distinction between central bank losses and corporate gains. Reforms are underway, but economists caution about debt sustainability and environmental impacts, underscoring the need for transparent, consolidated public-sector accounting.
Ghana is currently embroiled in a significant political and economic dispute regarding the financial performance of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) and the associated Bank of Ghana's (BoG) Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP). Conflicting reports have emerged, with the Minority in Parliament citing a reported US$1.7 billion loss, while GoldBod insists it made a substantial profit, leaving the public questioning which account to believe.
The Minority in Parliament, led by Alexander Afenyo-Markin, has filed a fresh motion seeking the establishment of an ad hoc committee to investigate a reported US$1.7 billion loss at GoldBod, an amount equivalent to approximately GH¢22 billion and 1.5% of Ghana's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2025. This figure, highlighted in the IMF's sixth review report, is linked to the DGPP. The Minority firmly rejects suggestions to rely solely on the Public Accounts Committee, advocating for an ad hoc committee as the appropriate mechanism to unravel the circumstances surrounding these losses. Old Tafo MP Vincent Ekow Assafuah stressed that the Minority would not alter its strategy for anyone's convenience, citing Article 103 of the 1992 Constitution and parliamentary Standing Orders 204, 212, 213, 262, and 263 as the basis for establishing such a committee.
Conversely, GoldBod Chief Executive Officer Sammy Gyamfi presented the institution's audited financial statements, signed by the Auditor-General, which show an operational surplus of GH¢907 million and an overall surplus of GH¢5.4 billion. Gyamfi vehemently refutes claims of GoldBod incurring losses, describing them as a "barefaced lie." He has challenged the Minority to substantiate allegations of extortion against Afenyo-Markin, accusing them of attempting to divert attention from the GoldBod losses. The Minority, in turn, stands firmly behind its leader, maintaining that such allegations should not distract from the substantive questions about GoldBod's financial position.
The apparent contradiction stems from a crucial distinction: the IMF's US$1.7 billion figure refers to losses recorded on the Bank of Ghana's balance sheet under the DGPP, while GoldBod's GH¢5.4 billion surplus reflects profits on its own corporate accounts. GoldBod acted as a gold-buying agent for the Bank of Ghana, limited to purchasing and aggregating gold from small-scale miners. It earned fees—an assay fee of 0.258% and a service fee of 0.5%, totaling 0.758%—which contributed to its reported surplus. The Bank of Ghana, however, absorbed the program's costs, including financing, exchange rate losses, discounts on gold sold to off-takers, and valuation effects. This arrangement, described as a "design flaw" rather than fraud, placed operational risk on the central bank while the agent profited.
The IMF's Country Report No. 26/213 indeed identified that losses from the DGPP exceeded US$1.7 billion in 2025, a significant increase from US$400 million in 2024. The primary sources of these losses included service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts on gold sold to off-takers and exporters, and exchange rate losses. Transaction costs associated with the program reached about 14.5% of gold value in 2025, contributing to the Bank of Ghana's negative equity position, which stood at 6.7% of GDP by the end of 2025.
Despite these losses, the DGPP also yielded benefits aligned with its policy objectives: formalizing the small-scale mining sector, reducing gold smuggling, strengthening foreign exchange reserves, and supporting the cedi. The Bank of Ghana reported an increase in gross international reserves from US$9.11 billion to US$13.83 billion in 2025 and cedi appreciation of over 40% against the US dollar. Through the program, 2.9 million ounces of gold were accumulated. However, the IMF noted that other factors, such as high global gold prices and a strong current account, also contributed to reserve accumulation.
Economist Professor Godfred Bopkin of the University of Ghana has offered critical insights, arguing that Eurobond holders, domestic bondholders, and pensioners, through their sacrifices during Ghana’s debt restructuring, were instrumental in restoring the country’s debt sustainability, rather than GoldBod. He cautioned that Ghana's improving fiscal position could be squandered if the fiscal space is not managed prudently, recalling a similar dissipation of gains after the Highly Indebted Poor Countries program. Prof. Bopkin also criticized the government's focus on gold trading gains, arguing that it overlooks the severe environmental damage caused by illegal mining (galamsey), which represents a significant "environmental subsidy" not accounted for in economic gains.
Adding to the debate, Tano North MP Dr. Gideon Boako questioned GoldBod's GH¢907 million profit claim, asserting that the figure does not adequately account for an alleged GH¢1 billion overdraft owed to the Bank of Ghana. He argued that if this liability were reflected in GoldBod’s books, the institution would actually be in a loss position.
In response to the identified issues, the Bank of Ghana Governor Dr Johnson Pandit Asiama reported that major reforms were introduced in 2025, including ring-fencing gold proceeds, stricter settlement rules, and reduced fees. Off-taker discounts, agent fees, and assay charges have been significantly cut, lowering total transaction costs to about 1.7%. Further reforms are planned for 2026, encompassing structured hedging, cost renegotiation, and a gradual withdrawal of direct BoG funding. A recapitalisation plan for the Bank of Ghana is also in place, spanning 2026 to 2032, to address the central bank's negative equity position of GH¢93.82 billion by the end of 2025.
Ultimately, the GoldBod debate highlights the need for a comprehensive and transparent accounting of the program's total costs and benefits across all state institutions. Citizens deserve a complete picture, encompassing financing, exchange rate effects, fees, reserve accumulation, formalization, and foreign exchange stabilization, to determine whether Ghana is effectively managing its gold resources for the benefit of the people. The Minority's fresh motion now awaits the Speaker of Parliament's consideration, setting the stage for the next phase of this critical inquiry.