As the new year commenced, the United States imposed a deadline on Sudan's warring factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), urging them to agree upon a humanitarian truce. This proposed truce was designed to establish safe humanitarian corridors, ensure the protection of civilians, and pave the way for a political process aimed at restoring civilian rule. While the RSF reportedly accepted the truce, which was to be facilitated by the Quartet (comprising the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE), the SAF explicitly refused the offer.

In a notable contrasting development, a tripartite agreement was reached concerning the strategically vital Heglig oil fields situated in West Kordofan. This deal temporarily neutralised the conflict in the area, leading to the withdrawal of SAF forces. Following this, the South Sudan People's Army assumed responsibility for securing these critical oil facilities. The Heglig fields are essential for processing approximately 130,000 barrels of South Sudanese crude oil daily, which is subsequently exported via pipelines traversing Sudan. The primary motivation behind this agreement was to safeguard significant economic interests tied to these oil revenues.

However, the Heglig arrangement quickly ignited controversy due to its narrow focus on economic assets while seemingly neglecting the severe plight of civilians in other ongoing conflict zones. Arwa El Siddig, assistant president of the National Youth Party, underscored this disparity in an interview, stating that the Heglig deal demonstrates that the war is not inherently inevitable. She emphasized, "The warring parties can agree when their immediate interests are at stake." El Siddig criticized the failure to extend similar protection and consideration beyond Heglig, issuing a warning that regions like Kordofan are now facing patterns of siege, violence, and displacement akin to those previously witnessed in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur.

Further details regarding the agreement were provided by Lt Col M. Mohammed Mohamed Nour of the Supreme Central Command, who confirmed that the deal was brokered through direct talks involving South Sudan President Salva Kiir, SAF Commander-in-Chief Lt Gen Abdelfattah, and RSF Commander Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Nour characterized the agreement as a significant political gain for the RSF, simultaneously suggesting a perceived weakening of the SAF's military capabilities. Dr Ahmed Babiker, leader of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, echoed the sentiment regarding the economic underpinnings of the conflict. He asserted that the Heglig agreement vividly reflects the economic logic of the war, explaining, "Both sides rely on oil and gold to finance the conflict. Peace is only possible when their economic interests are threatened." Babiker also lamented the inability of political forces to unite, leaving civilians vulnerable amidst the warring militias.

Looking to the future, El Siddig proposed that Heglig could potentially serve as a model for broader civilian protection efforts, provided there is sufficient political will, robust third-party guarantees, and sustained international pressure. She passionately stressed the urgent necessity of treating human life as "non-negotiable" before the humanitarian crisis further escalates and spreads across the region.