In Angola, major public spending decisions are not typically announced in televised addresses or debated in Parliament. Instead, they frequently appear as formal presidential decrees in the Diário da República. These decrees, often written in technical language, authorize contracts that have the power to reshape entire sectors of the economy. An extensive review of 476 presidential decrees, drawn from over 500 examined during President João Lourenço's two terms in office between 2017 and today, reveals that at least US$61.5 billion has been approved through a mechanism known as simplified procurement. This figure represents a documented sample and, even as a partial record, highlights the significant scale at which executive discretion has operated in the country's financial landscape.

A critical finding from the analysis is the substantial lack of transparency regarding the ultimate recipients of these funds. In 203 of the 476 analyzed decrees, accounting for 42.6 percent of the cases, no beneficiary is publicly named. These unidentified contracts alone represent US$25.69 billion, or 41.8 percent of the total validated amount, raising significant questions about accountability and public oversight in the allocation of vast public resources.

The review also identified a notable concentration of resources among specific actors. Among the largest aggregated beneficiaries identified are: Mitrelli Group, including state exposure through Luminar Finance credit lines, with US$11.3 billion (18.37 percent of the analyzed total); the government's drought-response program (PCESSA) with US$4.3 billion (7 percent); Omatapalo, receiving US$2.77 billion (4.5 percent); Gemcorp, with US$2.5 billion (4.06 percent); Odebrecht/OECI, accounting for US$2.486 billion (4.04 percent); MCA, with US$2.174 billion (3.53 percent); Grupo Opaia, receiving US$1.87 billion (3.04 percent); and Mota-Engil, with US$1.3 billion (2.11 percent). Collectively, these principal identified beneficiaries account for approximately 27.5 percent of the total value analyzed. It is also suggested that some of these firms may appear as subcontractors in larger projects, implying that financial concentration might extend beyond what is directly visible in the decrees.

Further complicating the picture,