The International Crisis Group, a respected Brussels-based think tank, has identified the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea as one of ten global conflicts that demand significant attention in 2026, following a violence-wracked 2025. This critical assessment places the Horn of Africa at risk of a major conflagration, particularly with the ongoing conflict in neighboring Sudan. Both Addis Ababa and Asmara have been exchanging accusations for months, pushing the two nations to the brink of war, a brewing crisis largely overlooked by a distracted international community.

At the heart of the dispute lies Ethiopia's profound desire to end its status as the world's most populous landlocked country. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has expressed his intent to "correct" the historical "mistake" of relinquishing sea access, a clear reference to Eritrea's ports, to which Ethiopia enjoyed unfettered access prior to Eritrea's 1993 secession. Conversely, Eritrea, under President Isaias Afwerki, views Abiy's ambitions as a direct threat to its territorial sovereignty and fears a potential reconquest of its vital ports. While public discourse centers on these issues, the roots of the current tensions are more recent.

The relationship between the two nations saw a significant shift when Abiy Ahmed assumed power in 2018, ending the three-decade rule of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Abiy quickly formed an alliance with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, who harbored a long-standing animosity towards the TPLF leadership, despite having fought alongside them in the 1974-1991 civil war against military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. Abiy leveraged this alliance to consolidate his rule against the TPLF's stiff opposition, finding Asmara a valuable partner.

This rapprochement culminated in the 2020-2022 war between Ethiopia and the Tigrayan leadership. During this conflict, Eritrean troops actively supported the Ethiopian federal government, fighting alongside allied militias from the Amhara and Afar regions located to Tigray's south. The war concluded at the end of 2022 with federal forces overwhelming Tigrayan defenses, leading to the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, in early November 2022.

However, the cessation of hostilities, while bringing temporary relief, opened new fissures. President Isaias Afwerki strongly opposed the peace negotiations, from which Eritrea was notably excluded. He believed the Tigrayan leadership should have been dealt a decisive blow, rather than engaged. Prime Minister Abiy, on the other hand, chose to negotiate with a weakened TPLF, potentially as a hedge against future confrontations with Eritrea. Since the Pretoria deal, Addis Ababa has reportedly engaged in a shadow war with both Asmara and elements within Ethiopia's Amhara community.

Abiy has accused Eritrea of providing support to an insurgency by the Amhara militia known as Fano, as well as to Oromo Liberation Army rebels operating in Oromia, Ethiopia's largest region. His potent statement on September 1, regarding the "correction" of Ethiopia's sea access "mistake," further exacerbated tensions. Adding another layer of volatility are the internal fractures within Tigray's leadership post-war. One faction, led by Getachew Reda, who represented the TPLF at the Pretoria talks, advocates for re-engagement with Addis Ababa. The opposing faction, notably fronted by former regional leader Debretsion Gebremichael, views the Pretoria deal as a humiliating surrender. In a surprising development, Debretsion's group has now forged ties with Asmara, Tigray's old enemy, compelling Getachew and his associates to seek refuge in the Ethiopian capital.

Currently, all sides are locked in a tense "staring contest." Ethiopia and Eritrea have reportedly undertaken extensive rearmament since the Tigray war. Clashes have erupted between Tigrayan factions, drawing in federal forces. Amhara militias appear to enjoy Asmara's support, while the leadership of Afar, a region abutting Eritrea's lowlands near its seaports, has aligned itself with Addis Ababa. The memory of the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war, which involved World War I-style trench fighting and resulted in tens of thousands of casualties, looms large over the current standoff.

The ongoing war in Sudan further complicates the regional security landscape. Asmara supports the Sudanese army, while Addis Ababa, though striving for neutrality, could potentially increase support for the Rapid Support Forces if a new conflict erupts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Such a scenario risks transforming a bilateral conflict into a wider regional conflagration, devastating an already fragile region reeling from the Tigray conflict and Sudan's war.

Despite the grave risks, there are reasons to hope that Ethiopia and Eritrea will avoid stepping off the cliff. Neither nation can predict the outcome of what would undoubtedly be a costly war, potentially devolving into a protracted quagmire. Ethiopia's leadership requires continued support from the International Monetary Fund, which new hostilities would severely imperil. Furthermore, few in Tigray desire more fighting so soon after the devastating impact of the last war. Given these high stakes, more proactive measures are needed to mitigate the risks. International actors who were pivotal in securing the Pretoria agreement, such as Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, should engage in shuttle diplomacy between Addis Ababa and Asmara, emphasizing the dire consequences of conflict. Other influential nations and organizations, including the U.S., China, the European Union, Gulf Arab countries, Türkiye, and the United Nations, should reinforce this crucial message, underscoring that a new confrontation between these two states and their powerful armies would be ruinous for the entire region.