On August 6, 2025, a tragic helicopter crash in Ghana claimed the lives of eight individuals, including high-ranking government officials and military personnel. The ill-fated Harbin Z-9EH military helicopter, tail number GHF 631, departed from Accra en route to Obuasi in the Ashanti Region for an anti-illegal mining operation, but lost radar contact and crashed in the Adansi Akrofuom District, approximately 6.5 miles from its destination. All eight occupants perished in the incident, including Defence Minister Dr. Edward Omane Boamah, Environment Minister Dr. Ibrahim Murtala Muhammed, Acting Deputy National Security Coordinator Alhaji Limuna Muniru Mohammed, NDC National Vice Chairman Dr. Samuel Sarpong, former parliamentary candidate Samuel Aboagye, and three crew members: Wing Commander Peter Baafemi Anala, Flight Lieutenant Manaen Twum Ampadu, and Flight Sergeant Ernest Addo-Mensah. An interdenominational funeral service for the victims was held at Black Star Square on Friday, August 15, followed by a burial at the Military Cemetery.

A government-appointed Investigative Committee, also known as the investigation board, publicly presented its findings on Tuesday, November 11, 2025, at Jubilee House. Captain (Rtd) Paul Forjoe, a retired pilot and senior aviation engineer with the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Prevention Bureau (AIB Ghana) and a member of the committee, detailed the extensive methodology used in the probe. The investigation team, comprising personnel from National Security, the Ghana Armed Forces, AIB Ghana, the National Intelligence Bureau, and U.S. Air Force advisors, immediately dispatched a Preliminary Investigation Team to secure the crash site and preserve perishable evidence. Key data from the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) – commonly referred to as the black box – were sent to the AVIC Flight Decoding Centre in Xi’an, China, between September 12 and 22, 2025, for extraction and interpretation.

Beyond technical analysis, the investigation meticulously assessed human factors and operational procedures. This involved reviewing medical and psychological records of the flight crew, conducting interviews with pilots, engineers, supervisors, and family members, and evaluating Ghana Meteorological Agency data, Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs), and eyewitness accounts to understand the weather conditions. The team also scrutinized Ghana Air Force policies, flight orders, operational oversight mechanisms, and risk management systems, including the air tasking order for the day. Using flight recorder data, radar tracks, eyewitness accounts, and analysis of similar accidents, the flight path was meticulously reconstructed to understand the sequence of events leading to the tragedy.

The investigation definitively determined that the primary cause of the accident was a sudden and powerful loss of altitude and lift due to a downdraft, which was directly linked to adverse weather conditions and the region's high terrain. This loss of altitude occurred without any change in engine power or pitch attitude from the pilots, effectively ruling out mechanical failure or direct pilot error in control input. A downdraft, explained as a strong current of air moving vertically downward, can rapidly overpower a helicopter’s rotors, drastically reducing effective lift. This scenario confirmed that an overwhelming external environmental factor, rather than a mechanical or human error, pushed the helicopter out of the sky.

Several contributing factors exacerbated the hazardous conditions. The flight, originally scheduled for 8:00 a.m., was delayed by approximately one hour, eventually departing Accra at 9:12 a.m., due to poor weather conditions across southern Ghana. Visibility at takeoff was misty, ranging between five and seven kilometers, with low clouds starting at about 700 feet. The crew initially flew under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), adjusting altitude to navigate patches of low clouds. However, as the helicopter moved north toward Obuasi, weather conditions deteriorated significantly. Eyewitnesses described fog, light rain, and visibility dropping to as low as 200 meters in rugged, hilly terrain known for turbulent wind currents and downdrafts. At 9:56 a.m., nearing Obuasi, the crew encountered thick cloud and mist, entering Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) and transitioning to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). Moments later, at 9:58 a.m., the aircraft suddenly lost altitude and struck a ridgeline at 1,370 feet above sea level.

While the Z-9 helicopter was found to be airworthy and serviceable—manufactured in 2012, delivered in 2015, and operating under a manufacturer-approved 90-day extension after its ten-year service threshold—it lacked crucial modern safety enhancements. These included a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS/EGPWS), advanced navigation with terrain mapping, an Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), and enhanced terrain-mapping navigation tools, all vital for flying safely in adverse weather over high terrain. Furthermore, the investigation highlighted systemic deficiencies: a limited national navigational capability, a lack of ground-based navigational aids en route, an absence of modern real-time flight monitoring and tracking systems (such as Flight Data Monitoring and real-time tracking systems like Secondary Surveillance Radar or ADS–B), and no simulator training for crews to practice recurrent procedures. Crucially, the crew was deemed competent, well-trained, and medically fit, with the captain holding the highest instrument rating available in the Ghana Air Force, ruling out human factors related to their performance.

Despite the challenging conditions, the emergency response was timely, with first responders reaching the difficult-to-access crash site within two hours, battling heavy rainfall and slippery slopes. To prevent future tragedies, the committee issued several key safety recommendations: modernise the Ghana Air Force fleet with modern aircraft equipped with TAWS/EGPWS and advanced navigation systems; ensure aircraft are fitted with audio-visual capable Cockpit Voice Recorders and Flight Data Recorders; invest in flight simulators for recurrent training; contract certified aviation weather providers; develop en route navigational aids, especially in remote areas; establish Flight Data Monitoring and en route tracking systems; and modernise ground support equipment to enhance operational safety. The Z-9 EH accident was concluded to be an unfortunate and sudden weather-related incident, with the implementation of these recommendations crucial for preventing recurrence.