A recent technical and forensic audit conducted by the Ghana Audit Service on the National Service Authority (NSA) has exposed a wide array of severe irregularities and financial mismanagement, particularly under its former leadership. The audit findings detail systemic failures in service‐delivery, financial controls and project governance, leading to substantial financial losses and a compromised national service system. Among the most striking revelations is the enrollment of a former Deputy Executive Director, Gifty Oware‑Aboagye, as a national service person while she was simultaneously serving as a full-time, salaried public officer — irregularly costing GH¢899,350.

The audit highlighted a pervasive reliance on protocol-based and manual override postings, which bypassed established automated controls and undermined the integrity of the national service posting system between 2018 and 2024. Out of 935,375 total postings during this period, an alarming 733,139 (78%) were executed through manual or protocol-override routes. These methods, intended for exceptional circumstances, became the dominant mechanism, lacking audit trails, biometric checks and proper oversight.

Additionally, over 842,000 (65%) of enrollments were manually uploaded by NSA staff and developers, further compromising enrollment integrity and exposing the payroll to manipulation. Weak PIN assignment and validation controls also resulted in payments totaling GH¢310,726,892.76 to personnel with inactive PINs, duplicate numbers or without validation.

Significant financial irregularities were identified in payments to National Service Personnel (NSPs). A staggering GH¢1.017 billion was irregularly paid to 120,777 personnel who received allowances beyond the legally mandated 13-month service period, with an additional GH¢144,608.43 in similar overpayments via GhanaPay. Furthermore, GH¢988.6 million in payments to personnel lacked biometric or monthly attendance validation, a practice that directly enabled widespread payroll fraud. Similar unvalidated payments via GhanaPay amounted to GH¢455,072.52.

The audit also uncovered payments of GH¢7,508,592.92 to 710 NSPs not found in the CSMP database, some with fabricated NSS numbers. Deductions from NSPs’ allowances totaling GH¢28.4 million (and an additional GH¢141,682.86 via GhanaPay) were found to be unaccounted for, suggesting fund diversion or manipulation. Manipulations linked to duplicate NSS numbers and multiple Ezwich USNs caused losses of GH¢149,960,667.35. Misappropriation and conflicts of interest were also prevalent. Former NSA Director‐General Osei Assibey Antwi allegedly irregularly received GH¢8.26 million under a volunteer number without supporting documentation. Two internal NSA staff members, Jacob Yawson (MIS Officer) and Gaisie Abraham Bismark (Head of Deployment), were paid GH¢20.2 million through vendor accounts, raising serious concerns about misappropriation. Payments totalling GH¢9.28 million were disbursed to the National Service Personnel Association (NASPA) without agreements or accountability, breaching financial regulations. Unsupported vendor payments of GH¢301.6 million (and GH¢334,610.11 via GhanaPay) were made to 32 vendors, including a substantial GH¢169 million to Direct Savings & Loans, lacking contracts, invoices or evidence of delivery. Ineligible age enrollments led to GH¢1.97 million being paid to personnel under 18, above 60 or with invalid ages.

Issues extended to the management of volunteers and project funds. Approximately 2,850 volunteers were improperly deployed to subvented agencies, receiving GH¢11.3 million without authorisation. An additional 6,460 volunteers at NSA offices/projects were paid GH¢38,871,987.00 without verifiable records; 269 GhanaPay volunteers received GH¢1,232,673.18 in similar circumstances. The audit also found GH¢35,012,946.34 in unconfirmable payments due to irregular volunteer identification. Additionally, a GH¢55 million allocation for a Service Extension Project was misapplied, GH¢34 million diverted to vehicles and irrigation systems, and only a fraction of the targeted acreage cultivated. Finally, GH¢152,467,100 (of which GH¢137,467,100 occurred in 2024) was irregularly transferred from e-cash to fiat without approval from the Ministry of Finance (Ghana). The audit report issued strong recommendations to address these findings, including the retrospective compilation of missing documentation, institutionalisation of ICT project governance, and transfer of payroll management to the Controller & Accountant‑General’s Department (CAGD). Critical recommendations also include strict enforcement of segregation of duties; restricting manual overrides to exceptional cases with dual approvals; ceasing irregular manual uploads; and recovering all irregular deductions and overpayments. The report calls for immediate suspension of unvalidated payments, sanctioning of responsible staff, and strict enforcement of validation processes integrated with CAGD payroll systems. These measures aim to restore transparency, accountability and financial integrity within the NSA.