Uff, so much spin by India, Pakistan, US, Prez Trump, PM Modi, PM Sharif, Defence Ministers Rajnath Singh and Khawaza Asif, international media, national media (both Godi and less-Godi – there’s no non-Godi media left!), Defence community and so on, the head is positively spinning now. But, through the fog, some things are evident. 

We thought, with our far superior air power, we’d just be all over Pakistan and they’d roll over and die. That didn’t happen. Both the sides had war-gamed long and hard. However, there were two deficits in the Indian war-gaming. We didn’t realise how long and how well Pakistan had been preparing for it. When the Pahalgam massacre happened, I thought Munir was being foolish – he should’ve known better after the Balakot strike. However, it seems, Pahalgam was not just trigger happiness on his part. He initiated it after working out the subsequent stages. 

What was expected to be a surgical airstrike without crossing our airspace turned into a large-scale dogfight with a huge number of aircrafts involved. It is not possible to hide this because the moment an aircraft is airborne, it can be tracked by the radars and satellite and the real-time data is preserved for a while. I do believe the estimate by various sources of around 125 aircrafts of both sides involved in the stand-off. Scrambling so many aircrafts so quickly does indicate serious advance preparation by Pakistan. 

Where the script went wrong for India is that we probably didn’t have enough or full information about the technological advancements Pakistan had managed in terms of acquiring Chinese 4.5 generation jets (J-10C) and PL-15 air-to-air missiles. The world had underestimated the effectiveness of these platforms and weapons.

While India gave clear-cut denials for all the other claims by Pakistan, on the question of downing of Rafale/s, it said, “There’s no evidence …” Hello, the Indian government doesn’t need evidence to know whether any of its own aircrafts was downed. It would’ve been inconvenient to admit, hence this answer. Plus, in the immediate aftermath, the Chengdu Corp (manufacturers of J-10C) stocks soared by 60 % while Dassault (manufacturer of Rafale) stocks climbed down by 7 % [both have market-corrected now]. It’s safe to assume that India lost aircrafts including Rafale/s. There’ve been no specific claims regarding Pakistan having lost any aircraft. In the air skirmish, it’s about honours even, with a slight tilt in favour of Pakistan. 

What worked better for India was the Air Defence system. While our S-400 withstood most of Pakistan’s sallies, India could breach the Pakistan defence system HQ-9/P and hit the nine intended targets on the first day and several airbases/ airports subsequently. Pakistan also managed to get through our system and hit a few things in the later stages of the conflict, but far less compared to India’s strikes. 

Looks like, while Pakistan was intimidated by the perceived appetite of India to prolong the tit-for-tat, India was also surprised by the scale and perseverance of the Pakistan retaliation. In the end, both sides were desperate for an out. 

This is just background. What I’m trying to get at is that India’s target/s were not achieved. The target was not hitting nine known ivy-league terror universities. The target was to overwhelm Pakistan and intimidate so that it considers terrorism as an expensive no-win proposition. That hasn’t happened. If anything, Munir, chasing institutional credibility and support has managed it and is pumped up. He must also be feeling how easy it is to organise a mini-war and benefit quickly before USA and others call time in short order. It’s his cost-benefit calculus that alone counts in Pakistan's policy so he’ll organise another terror attack whenever it’s convenient or desirable for him. 

Regardless of the spin, the people at the helm know exactly what the situation is. The two sides haven’t reached a Nash Equilibrium point where any (mis)adventure will assure mutual self-destruction. Further terrorist incidents are round the corner. So what should we do? 

First and foremost, we must go all out to build a fool-proof air defence system, an impenetrable "iron dome." It should be so robust like Israel’s that not a single missile should be able to barge through. 

Next, and simultaneously, we must shop around for 5^th generation aircrafts which will be the best in the world and have them in bulk. Whatever enhancements are required for the existing Rafales must be undertaken urgently. 

Simultaneously, this defensive shield and offensive capabilities must extend to the intelligence domain too. We should have such a robust system that terrorists can’t sneak through or operate. In case a terrorist attack does materialise, we should be able to detect and destroy the perpetrators within no time. Obviously, we’ve miles to go in this. Not only that Pahalgam could not be prevented, there were glaring lapses in the security arrangements and till date, we haven’t been able to find out who, what and why. There has not been a single arrest. 

We must develop the Covert Action Capability (CAC) of intelligence, manpower and equipment such that we could match how USA took out Osama Bin Laden without the faintest idea of his harbourers or the Israeli intelligence killing/ injuring thousands of Hezbollah operatives in Syria and Lebanon through simultaneously exploding pagers and walkie-talkies (Operation Grim Beeper, 2024). If we could’ve eliminated Dawood Ibrahim and LeT Chief or organised simultaneous explosions affecting a few Pakistani top generals immediately after Pahalgam, that would’ve been a decisive victory. Plus, we could’ve basked in the deniability like that of Pakistan on Pahalgam. All this is difficult but possible, if the priorities are right. After all, we’ve the money – we are an economic powerhouse; we should make it count. 

In my estimate, we have about a year before the next terrorist attack. We should prepare so well that the response to that one should be decisive. 

Meanwhile, aur janab kya chal raha hai? 

Hindustan aur Pakistan, dono jagah fog (of war) chal raha hai.