'Bloody Bucket' at Colmar - Warfare History Network
Not long after they landed at Normandy in July 1944, Pennsylvania’s 28th Infantry Division earned a begrudging nickname from their German foes in the hedgerows—the “Bloody Bucket Division,” after their blood-red “Keystone” shoulder patches and vicious fighting tactics.
The name would fit them well as they went on to help close the Falaise Pocket and were the first American troops, briefly, into Germany in fighting at the Siegfried Line, where they took 3,000 casualties.
After fierce fighting in the Hürtgen Forest in November 1944, Maj. Gen. Norman Cota’s 28th Division suffered nearly 6,000 casualties was sent to a 30-mile front on the west bank of the Our River in Luxembourg, a place that First Army thought would be a quiet sector to rest and replace their losses.
Then, on December 16, the Battle of the Bulge began with the German Wehrmacht tearing through the 28th Division front on their way to Belgium. They fought hard and managed to disrupt Hitler’s timetable while sustaining more than 5,100 casualties.
Finally, the battered Keystone Division was brought back up to strength with thousands of new replacements and they spent early January 1945 near Charleville refitting and defending the Meuse River from Givet to Verdun. Troops manned outposts at road junctions and bridges in key cities.
But as the Allies turned the tide at Bastogne in late January 1945, an 850-square-mile section on the far eastern border of France was still held by the Germans—the Colmar Pocket. The 6th Army Group, along with the French First Army, had been trying since November of 1944 to force Wehrmacht Gen. Siegfried Rasp’s 19th Army, comprising seven infantry divisions, one mountain division and one Panzer brigade, out of Alsace and back over the Rhine.
Though they were hampered in their task partly by manpower shortages, mountainous geography and winter weather, the biggest factor was that that the Germans laid claim to the French regions of Alsace and Lorraine and Hitler had ordered a do-or-die defense of the area around Colmar, a town since the Middle Ages. In November, French First Army commander Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s unsuccessful first effort to collapse the pocket had been interrupted by the Bulge crisis, and had also been affected by the decision to send many of the colonial African troops—experienced veterans who had fought in Italy—to the south. They were replaced with Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior), many of whom were militia and local draftees of varying quality and experience.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front, wanted the last German toe-hold in France removed as soon as possible, calling it “a sore” on the 6th Army Group front. De Lattre and 6th Army Group commander Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers requested U.S. reinforcements for the offensive. Eisenhower’s aide, Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, offered the 10th Armored Division and the 28th ID, but warned that after what the latter had been through, they were “capable of only limited offensive action.”
In less than three weeks after it was relieved from battling the German forces in the Ardennes, the 28th Division would be involved in what has come to be known as the “forgotten campaign.” In the middle of winter, they traveled southeast to the Vosges Mountains south of Kaysersberg by train on frigid French “forty and eights”—railcars from World War I made to hold 40 men or eight horses.Still badly battered from the Ardennes fighting, the division was tasked to establish a line in the First French Army sector that curved from the vineyards of the Colmar plain to the rugged fringes of the Vosges mountains.
The 28th Division is the oldest continuously serving division in the U.S. Army. It was officially established by General Order Number 1 on March 12, 1879. Elements of the division can trace their histories back to 1747, when Benjamin Franklin organized his battalion of Associators in Philadelphia. Other units of the 28th Division had their beginnings in the Revolutionary War to include Troop A, First Squadron, 104th Cavalry and the 109th Artillery Regiment organized as the 24th Connecticut Militia. These units fought with George Washington’s Army.
General Cota became commander of the 28th Infantry in August, 1944, after landing in Normandy on D-Day with the 116th Infantry Regiment of the 29th Infantry Division. He had been heavily involved in the planning and execution of the Allied invasion and became famous for personally leading the assaults on Omaha Beach and motivating the troops grounded by the heavy fire of German machine guns.
Now the Keystone Division was to take over the northwestern perimeter of the pocket, along the Kaysersberg Valley just above Colmar, while the 3rd Algerian Division screened the extreme northern perimeter south of Strasbourg. The 28th was given the task of protecting the flank of the 3rd and 75th U.S. Infantry Divisions. The 2nd and 4th Moroccan and the 9th Colonial Infantry Divisions, along with the 1st French Armored Division, would assault the southern portion of the pocket. The 3rd Infantry Division and two other French divisions would be concentrated in between, south of Sélestat, for the thrust at Neuf-Brisach and the Rhine River.
At first the 28th ID was merely holding positions in the snow-swept Vosges Mountains, sending out patrols through waist-deep snow to test the enemy strength and lobbing artillery fire from one mountain crest to another. There were mine fields under the deep snow, and some of the infantrymen who went out on patrols failed to return. German mortar fire landed continuously around the American positions. The men huddled in foxholes dug in the snow and ate frozen C-Rations for days before it was possible to bring up warm food.
In addition to treating wounds from small arms, mortars, artillery and mines there were many casualties from frostbite and trench foot. The wounded had to be hauled back to aid stations on sleds where freezing temperatures made the administration of plasma to the wounded difficult. Then suddenly the division was ordered to attack.
General Cota’s message to the commander of the 109th Infantry Regiment, Colonel James Rudder, was brief and to the point: “We go to Colmar.” Rudder, who had been in command of the 2nd Ranger Battalion on D-Day when his Rangers scaled the cliffs at Pointe-du-Hoc, would lead his regiment in spearheading the division’s attack down the slopes of the Vosges foothills, across the flat, marshy plain, and through a forest to reach the outskirts of the strongly defended city of Colmar, the third largest in Alsace. With the late start, it was pitch black by the time they had entered the forest.
The French city was so well fortified and defended that the Colmar pocket was still occupied by the Germans, though the Allies had advanced all along its fringes. As they reached a vineyard on the outskirts of town, the men divided up to navigate through the rows . Not finding any resistance, they emerged from the vineyard to find the highway to Colmar. As they marched down the highway, units regrouped and moved to a row of trenches as they approached the town.
The 109th IR moved with extreme haste, as they had learned from Rudder training them in the way of the Army Rangers. They were also trained in night operations.
Their speed on the way to Colmar put them in an area scheduled for friendly artillery that was meant to precede their approach. As shells began falling around them, 109th Infantry officer William Pena remembered the artillery observer having to radio back for a cease fire.
In the coordinated thrust with the French Armored Combat Command 4, the 109th IR had rooted the Germans out of their concealed trenches and overran their artillery positions before the Germans had time to depress the muzzles of their high-velocity 88mm guns.
Tom W. Hickman, Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 109th IR, wrote in his diary on February 4: “Entered Colmar at 9 a.m. Street fighting in the outskirts. Pretty rugged for a while. Many casualties from mines and booby traps. The Germans have them planted everywhere. We would never have made it this morning had it not been for the presence of our two flak wagons. The 447th Anti-Aircraft Artillery came along with us and those boys really did a marvelous job. They had multiple .50-caliber machine guns mounted on each truck throwing a grand total of 1,000 rounds per minute at the Germans. They kept the Germans pinned down long enough for us to get to them.”
The French 5th Armored Division caught up to the 109th IR on the outskirts of Colmar on February 2. Rudder let the French lead the way, and by 11:30 a.m. they had taken back the town that had been in enemy hands for nearly five years. By 11:45 there was only scattered resistance in the city, and by 4 p.m. Colmar was mostly in Allied hands.
The cost to the 109th IR was relatively light despite the difficulty of the mission: 125 men killed, wounded, or missing. The 109th set up a defensive perimeter south of the city in case of a German counterattack. When morning came the next day, mopping up operations in Colmar were underway. Happy crowds of French townspeople greeted the men of the 28th ID as they patrolled the streets. In recognition of their skills, the infantrymen of the 109th were later awarded the French Croix de Guerre.
On February 4th, coordinating with the 109th ID, the 12th Armored Division launched an attack toward Sundhoffen.
The 112th Infantry Regiment, meanwhile, had the task of attacking along the 28th ID’s right flank, capturing a string of small towns to the west of Colmar. The 112th was commanded by Col. Gustin M. Nelson, a 1921 West Point graduate. He was the former Trains commander for 5th Armored Division—in charge of personnel, vehicles and equipment that make up the rear echelon—but wanted a more active combat assignment. He’d gotten his wish with an assignment to the 28th Division.
The 3rd Battalion of the 112th IR left Kaysersberg, about five miles northwest of Colmar, about 10 p.m. on February 1 and went south to Ammerschwihr, where the companies separated to attack toward their objectives. On February 2, Company K went on to Niedermorschwihr and took it against light opposition. Company L took Katzenthal. The next day, Company I was to attack Turckheim. In the morning they left for Turckheim in platoon formation, when the Germans were observed at the top of a hill about 200 yards outside of Niedermorschwihr waving their hands. A squad from the 1st platoon was sent up through the open field toward the crest of the hill, and the Germans yelled “Comrade” and then followed that appeal with rapid small-arms fire. The remainder of the 1st and 3rd platoons was ordered to form a line and suppress the Germans while the 2nd platoon was ordered to enter the outskirts of the town and hold it until the skirmish was cleaned up.
The Americans had underestimated the strength of the enemy and their superior observation positions. “All we could do was lay there,” said Sergeant Curtis, “there was no cover. They were hitting us from all sides with mortars and everything they had.” The whole company came under a barrage of phosphorus and fragmentation rounds from heavy mortars. Having come under terrific fire from the Germans, the Americans had to withdraw.
Orders were given for Company I to move to Wintzenheim. The men were exhausted, resting in any corner and asleep in any available place, while some listened on their SCR 300 radios to Company K’s attack on Turckheim. On February 4, Turckheim was freed by Company K, supported by elements of the French 1st Shock Battalion. The 112th’s 3rd Battalion moved south with Walbach as their objective. No opposition was encountered, and various elements of the battalion went through the towns of Niedermorschwihr, Turckheim, Zimmerbach, and Walbach.
Company B, 1st Battalion had been sitting in Sigolsheim for two weeks when orders finally came to attack into the vineyards directly in front of their positions. Their first big objective was to capture the town of Ingersheim. Charles Haug remembered that they had only gone 500 yards when they ran into terrific small-arms fire. The Germans seemed to have placed machine guns all over the vineyards, and many of the Americans were hit.
The 112th IR men finally knocked out the guns and by mid-afternoon found themselves at the edge of Ingersheim. After meeting little resistance, they moved into the town. The 1st Battalion took over Ingersheim while the 2nd Battalion protected its right flank.
The Americans received new orders to capture the small town of Trois-Épis located on the mountainside about 15 miles from Ingersheim. They got about a mile outside of Ingersheim when they met their first German resistance. About 20 Germans were dug in along the mountainside and started to fire on the men from the 112th IR, but after firing a few rounds, they raised their hands and surrendered.
A couple of men took the prisoners back to Ingersheim. The rest made slow progress on the rugged path up the mountain until they came to a place where the Germans had felled hundreds of trees across the path. Climbing over, crawling under, and squirming in and out of the trees, the men got within a few hundred yards of the town by 4 a.m.
Patrols were sent into the town and the German resisted at the first house the Americans approached before they scattered through the town. By noon, the Americans had killed or captured most of the defenders. As the men searched the houses, they came across civilians in the basements. The Germans had bound their wrists with wire and told them to stay there.
The Germans had told the villagers that the Americans usually killed all civilians as they took a town. As the men helped the people out of the basements and untied them, the villagers would fall on their knees and beg for mercy. When they found out that the Americans weren’t going to kill them, they would throw their arms around the men with joy.
The 110th Infantry Regiment came out of Corps reserve on February 4 to get into the fight. It was commanded by Colonel Daniel Strickler, who had been in Company B, 109th Machine Gun Battalion, as the youngest U.S. Army captain during World War I.
Strickler’s 3rd Battalion was alerted to repel a counterattack in the 112th IR sector and moved to the vicinity of Ingersheim, just northwest of Colmar, where it took up a position to protect the bridge there. At the same time, the 1st Battalion was ordered to seize and hold the town of Herrlisheim, just south of Colmar.
On the morning of February 5, the town was taken against light resistance. On February 6, the 2nd Battalion moved to Biltzheim on the Ill River and then east toward the Rhône-Rhine Canal. By 2 p.m., a crossing was made using improvised bridges of debris and pontoon boats. Some small-arms fire was received on the march east, but all objectives had been seized by mid-afternoon.
Toward evening, however, the 3rd Battalion was subjected to heavy fire from the entrenched Germans and was forced to withdraw to the vicinity of Rustenhart to allow friendly artillery to fire on the hostile positions. German machine-gun fire inflicted approximately 30 casualties on the battalion, and during the night it suffered a heavy German artillery barrage.
There were many who made the ultimate sacrifice around Colmar. For example, 1st Lieutenant Thomas Ferguson was commanding Company G, 110th IR. Ferguson was leading a small reconnaissance force of three men in the mountains near Colmar, probing the German positions to determine the locations of their outposts. Three- and four-foot snow drifts made progress difficult as the men pushed cautiously into the German lines with Lieutenant Ferguson in the lead. As they followed a narrow, tortuous mountain path that was half-hidden in the drifting snow, Ferguson felt his foot trip a wire hidden beneath the snow’s surface. The sharp crack of the detonator flashed its own warning, and in the split-second before the mine exploded, Ferguson shouted for his men to hit the ground. At the same time, Ferguson threw himself forward to cover the mine’s blast with his own body and was killed instantly. A sergeant that was following closely behind was wounded over the eye, but he and the two other men undoubtedly owed their lives to Ferguson’s instant action and heroic self-sacrifice.
The 110th regimental command post moved to Oberhergheim on the Ill River, and by 2:30 a.m. on February 7, a Bailey bridge had been constructed across the river at that location. Battalion transportation began to cross the bridge immediately, and by mid-morning the vehicles, together with boats and bridging equipment, had rejoined their parent units, which were attempting to force a crossing of the Rhône-Rhine Canal. Before noon both the 1st and 3rd Battalions had crossed the canal and established bridgeheads. In the afternoon the 2nd Battalion moved up and relieved the 3rd of its mission of protecting the site, while the 2nd Battalion moved on toward the Rhine River. That night the 1st Battalion also moved east from the canal toward the Rhine.
On February 8, 28th Infantry Division soldiers led the color guard at the Colmar Victory Parade. Then, both the 109th and 110th regiments swung east toward the Rhine. A patrol from Company I, 110th Infantry, reached the Rhine the next morning.
That same day, the German rearguard at Chalampé was eliminated, leaving no major German forces on the Rhine’s west bank and signaling the end of Allied operations to reduce the Colmar pocket as well as the 28th Infantry Division’s involvement in Alsace.
In addition to the 28th’s infantry, many other elements took part in the Colmar battles. The 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, for example, reached Colmar on February 2 and from the 3rd to the 9th, they conducted various missions consisting of liaison and contact between the 12th Armored Division and the 110th Infantry Regiment.
On February 4, they were sent to Wintzenheim, about two miles west of Colmar, to assist the French Rangers in the defense of the town, using roadblocks and roving patrols. The next day the Troop went to Hattstatt, five miles south of Colmar, to contact the French forces and act as flank protection for the 110th Infantry in its attack toward the Rhine. On the 6th, the Troop moved to Oberhergheim continuing the mission of flank protection.
Some additional examples include the 108th Artillery Battalion that fired concentrations for the 109th Infantry on Sainte-Croix-en-Plaine and Niederhergheim. The 28th Quartermaster Company provided supplies, burial and graves registration, and laundry and shower service throughout the period. In conjunction with the Colmar operation, the 103rd Medical Battalion set up medical clearing stations in numerous towns throughout the Colmar area.
The 103rd Combat Engineers assisted with the division operations. It snowed constantly, and the drifts were higher than a man’s head on the main supply routes. Every step of the way into Colmar was dependent upon engineer work. Every road was heavily mined, and booby traps were common. Many times the engineers turned into infantrymen and fought alongside the foot soldiers in the rough mountain skirmishes. There were many more units that contributed to the success of the 28th Division.
As the Colmar Pocket collapsed along with the remaining German defenses, American soldiers shifted their attention to the final part of their mission: to eliminate the German threat on the west side of the Rhine once and for all and align their forces for the final offensive into Germany. As the men of the 28th Division moved east, they were proud to have helped liberate the French towns, and veterans of the Colmar pocket spoke fondly of the French citizens they met along the way.
The 28th Division would have one final action. Moving back north on February 23 and attacking across the Ahr River in Germany before being placed in defensive positions.
In all, the 28th ID would be on the front line for 196 days of combat before they returned to the United States on August 2, 1945. Their casualties during that time totaled 16, 762 ( 2,316 killed in action; 9,609 wounded in action; 884 missing; 3,953 POWs).
The 109th Infantry Regiment received the French Croix de guerre from General Charles de Gaulle, the President of the Provisional Government of France. One of its members, Technical Sergeant Francis J. Clark, U.S. Army, Company K, would also receive the Medal of Honor for gallantry during the Siegfried Line Campaign in September 1944. Another, Private Edward Slovik, would become the only American soldier to be executed for cowardice since the American Civil War. More than 21,000 soldiers were sentenced during the war, including 49 death sentences. Only Slovik’s, in January 1945, was carried out.
Members of the 28th ID also received the following awards for their European campaign—Distinguished Service Cross: 16, Legion of Merit: 4, Silver Star: 258, Soldiers Medal: 16, Bronze Star: 2,029 and Air Medal: 92.
In an essay for Link magazine, the 28th Division’s Private Henry Johnson wrote that in addition to freedom of worship and freedom from fear, he was fighting for “what I consider to be the American way of life. That great ideal is high enough and fine enough to challenge me to fight, and, if need be, to die to guarantee its realization.”
Dr. Walter S. Zapotoczny Jr. is a retired U.S. Army historian and professor of history. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and has published 11 books and operations documents. He resides near Hershey, Pennsylvania.
