Carl Von Clausewitz’s aphorism that war is a continuation of politics by other means is lent credence as the conflict in Sudan enters its third year since war broke out on 15 April 2023.

The hostilities between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the primary belligerents – and their allied armed groups have since escalated to multiple frontlines across the country. 

The geospatial escalation of military operations is increasingly accompanied by political overtures, with SAF announcing intentions to form a technocratic government. In contrast, on April 16, the RSF, a coalition of civilian and political forces and armed groups, declared a parallel government. Significantly, the political overtures occurred at different intervals during the conflict with SAF, starting earlier when it was militarily disadvantaged and trying to form a broad alliance with other armed groups and political forces against the RSF. These recent political initiatives triggered diplomatic tensions in the greater Horn of Africa (HOA), undermining regional peace initiatives and eliciting the interest of medium powers outside the region, including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. 

Although the power struggle between SAF commander Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan and Gen. Mohamed Dagalo Hemedti, the RSF leader, following disagreements about integrating the paramilitary group into a unified army, may have provoked the current conflict, other underlying historical factors also contributed. 

Fifty-seven years of military rule out of the 69 years of independence gradually militarised the Sudanese socio-economic and political theatre, entrenching corruption and exclusion, with military loyalists, many from the dominant central riverine elite, dominating key sectors such as oil, banking, and gold. The 35 coup attempts and plots recorded since independence, seven of which were successful, underscore the volatility of the military rule as these elites jostled for power. The exclusive nature of successive military governments and their willingness to use force to dissuade demands for greater inclusion and representation by the marginalised population sparked armed rebellions in the peripheral areas. 

Additionally, the concentration of political power and wealth in the central Sudanese region, home to Sudanese Arabs with Islamic identity, promoted ethnic and religious undertones during agitations against Khartoum. For instance, these nuances emerged during the agitation for self-determination of the Southern Sudan region, culminating in South Sudan’s independence in 2011. The RSF has been courting political support from the population in the peripheral areas by routinely calling for the dissolution of the 1956 state to remedy the marginalisation. The military’s counterinsurgency tactics against these rebellions in the peripheral regions had significant ramifications that hindered the army’s ability to subdue the RSF, at least in the initial stages of the conflict. 

Principally, endemic corruption, nepotism, tribalism, and racism infested government institutions, including the SAF, during the 30-year regime of ousted President Omar al-Bashir, undermining its battle readiness. Skewed recruitment into the army, with politically connected individuals bloating the upper ranks, while members of the population from disenfranchised areas were enrolled into the lower ranks, undermined professionalism, leading to entrenched structural challenges that ranged from a lack of discipline to internal competing political interests. Furthermore, Bashir exacerbated competition and rivalries within the army by fostering divisions along tribal lines and exploiting ideological differences between Arab nationalists and Islamists in the military as part of his elaborate plans to mitigate the threats of a coup from a unified military. 

The frequent tactic by the Bashir regime of outsourcing security to tribal militia groups (typically to a rival community or armed groups leading a rebellion) as part of its counter-insurgency campaigns, inadvertently undermined the military’s fighting capacity by denying it valuable fighting experience. In the early 2000s, the military relied on Arab militias, the Janjaweed – then led by Musa Hilal, with Hemedti as one of his field commanders – in its counterinsurgency against the Darfur rebels of African descent. 

Later, after Hilal fell out with Bashir, the latter relied on Hemedti to repel rebellions in Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur and later rewarded him by officially reconstituting his Janjaweed fighters into the RSF paramilitary outfit. Hemedti became Bashir’s most critical protector, referring to him as Hemeyti (my protection in Arabic). The SAF became accustomed to defending fixed positions in a garrison town approach where the army controls strategic installations in urban centres with little presence in the surrounding rural areas. Perhaps as a direct consequence of this military operational custom, the RSF easily besieged SAF forces in their bases in different urban areas across numerous states once the fighting commenced.     

The RSF’s ascendance into a significant player began in 2014, when Bashir reconstituted the group into a paramilitary group, constitutionally recognising it as a regular force. Thus, as part of the Sudanese security architecture, the RSF gained access to weapons and arms, becoming better equipped and supplied than during the Janjaweed period. The involvement of RSF fighters in the Saudi-Emirati military intervention in Yemen after Sudan agreed with Riyadh to deploy troops benefited the RSF immensely by exposing its fighters to urban warfare, complementing the highly mobile and swift guerrilla tactics that it had perfected in Darfur. 

Some observers attribute the ability of the RSF to control Khartoum and other urban areas for close to two years of fighting to this exposure. The conflict also earned the RSF substantial financial gains. Despite Burhan commanding the operation, Dagalo received most of the money because most fighters were from the paramilitary group. The RSF’s sources of income appreciated significantly in 2017 after it defeated and captured rival Musa Hilal, gaining control of the artisanal gold mines in Jebel Amer in South Darfur State. Critically, the military adventure allowed the RSF to create networks in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which the group has reportedly used to establish logistical operations to supply weapons via its connections in Libya, Chad, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Uganda. Furthermore, the financial empowerment enabled the RSF to recruit significantly, with its personnel estimated at 75,000 and 100,000 fighters in 2021 compared to SAF’s 120,000 to 200,000 troops.     

Additionally, through its international exposure and networks, the RSF improved its military capabilities, acquiring skills in gathering intelligence via satellite imagery from its association with the then pro-Kremlin mercenary outfit, the Wagner Group. In 2022, the paramilitary group received high-end surveillance technology capable of converting smartphones into audio-visual informants from an Israeli company. The RSF has also perfected the art of manipulating the competing regional and sub-regional dynamics to secure external support as part of its military strategy. This was best demonstrated during the swift capture of Wad Madani, the Al Gezira State capital, after the military suddenly capitulated in December 2023. 

RSF fighters infiltrated Wad Madani and formed sleeper cells prior to the attack; all the while, the paramilitary group was escalating its probing attacks in the border areas between Al Gezira and Khartoum states, north of Wad Madani. Meanwhile, the RSF bought the loyalty of the Sudan Shield Forces, led by Abu Aqla Kaykal, alongside other military officers and soldiers, who commanded the attack on Wad Madani. Kaykal formed the shield forces in 2022, claiming to protect northern Sudan from the RSF and declaring allegiance to the SAF and Burhan. The RSF has also deliberately used targeted attacks, killing civilians to intimidate them, loot their property and displace them. 

However, the strategy of dispensing indiscriminate violence against civilians has proven to be a double-edged sword for the RSF, particularly in regions outside its strongholds in Darfur. The tactic is detrimental to the paramilitary group, costing it valuable community affinity, which the SAF has exploited, particularly in Al Gezira, River Nile, North and South Kordofan, and Kassala states, and in part of the Darfur region, launching civilian mobilisation with ethnic undertones. Although other factors played a role, the blatant targeting of civilians may have contributed to the realignment of Abu Aqla Kaykal with the SAF in October 2024. Consequently, the mobilisation rejuvenated the military and played a critical role in pushing back the RSF in Sennar, Al Gezira and Khartoum states. 

Structural issues that undermine control and command structures within the rank and file of the RSF contribute extensively to the indiscriminate violence against civilians, leading to hostilities from host communities. Perhaps acknowledging this shortcoming emanating from extensive ethnic mobilisation, the RSF has reportedly embarked on recruitment and training operations in South Darfur State to establish a new professional force.  

Diplomatic interventions

The Sudan war has entered its third year, a clear indication of the failure of diplomatic interventions in the conflict. 

Various interventions have been attempted, key among them the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet, the Jeddah process and the Cairo Initiative.

The IGAD Quartet brought together Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and South Sudan, and was mandated to work with the African Union Commission to find a mediated solution to the conflict.

The initiative never got off the ground after the Sudan junta, led by Gen. Burhan, rejected Kenya’s President William Ruto as lead mediator in the IGAD initiative; Gen. Burhan accused Ruto of harbouring RSF commanders in Nairobi. Diplomatic ties between Kenya and Sudan have since been severed following the announcement of the formation of a parallel government in Sudan from Nairobi by the RSF and its allies despite overtures and protests by the junta government.

Burhan was more inclined to the Egyptian or the Jeddah processes. This was, however, not acceptable to the RSF, who are backed by the UAE. External interference and support for the two belligerents have been some of the main factors frustrating the diplomatic interventions. In March, IGAD Executive Secretary Dr Workneh Gebeyehu called for “a unified mediation effort”, which he said offers the best path to a negotiated resolution. 

This has left the African Union (AU) and IGAD exposed – the bodies that should be the channels for the “African Solutions to African Problems” approach.

It is ironic that Kenya and South Sudan were among the states participating in the UK-led Sudan Conference in London in April, a meeting the Sudan government disassociated itself from. In what reflected the external forces playing out in the Sudan conflict and the peace processes themselves, participating countries from the Arab League, among them the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, disagreed on issues surrounding Sudan’s governance and the wording of the communiqué that was to be issued after the meeting.

According to a Reuters report, the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia disagreed on the “insistence by some participants of the inclusion of a civilian-led government versus a path to end the war and leaving the issue of governance to the Sudanese to decide later on”.

This collapse or paralysis is, however, not new in the Sudan.

Many peace processes have been initiated but have either never materialised or have broken down during implementation, a demonstration of the complexity of the Sudan conflict. 

Major peace processes and agreements in the run-up to 2006 include the Darfur peace process that resulted in the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006. The negotiations involved the N’Djamena talks (Chad, 2003-04) and the Inter-Sudanese peace talks on Darfur (AU, 2004-06). There was also the Eastern peace process, which included the Asmara talks in Eritrea (2006) and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement of October 2006.

The most engaging was the North-South peace process, which involved at least 10 rounds of talks: Addis Ababa talks (Ethiopia, 1972), the Addis Ababa Agreement (March 1972), Koka Dam talks (Ethiopia, 1986), Addis Ababa talks (Ethiopia and Egypt, 1989), Abuja talks (Nigeria, 1992-93), Peace talks on the Sudan conflict (IGADD 1993-94), “Peace From Within” talks (1992-97), Khartoum Peace Agreement (April 1997), the Egyptian-Libyan initiative (1999–2002) and the Sudan peace process (IGAD, 1997–2005).

Kenya, which has played a key role in the peace negotiations, hosted the Machakos Protocol (July 2002).

The UN also facilitated the Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements in September 2003, while the Agreement on Wealth Sharing was signed in January 2004. 

There was also the May 2004 Protocol on Power Sharing between the Sudan government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) regarding power sharing in Sudan. 

The Three Areas Protocols of May 2004 provided for a special status for the Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile regions. The deal was a key step towards the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005 and ended the Sudanese civil war.

Despite all these processes, Sudan is once again in a protracted war. 

The different capitals where these talks were held point to the intricate external interests and interference that cloud the Sudan situation. 

Ameer Chughtai and Theodore Murphy, fellows at The European Council on Foreign Relations, argue that the Sudan conflict has given rise to “multiple and sometimes divisive mediation efforts”.

“Sudan’s seven immediate neighbours and the three across the Red Sea (the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) all harbour interests in the outcome of the conflict – and Sudan’s elites are well practised in cultivating a proliferation of their mediation efforts,” they say of the ongoing conflict. 

The two add that Sudan’s political culture encourages this proliferation of peace negotiations through “forum shopping” to create political capital. Their analysis notes that each party to the conflict, or the negotiators, deliberately build their external initiatives and then influence the mediator to shape the process in their favour. This points to a lack of political will on the part of the parties to the conflict.

“These multiple forums dilute mediator influence and result in an array of uncoordinated proposals.”This is demonstrable through the many layers of international negotiations since the 2005 CPA. 

Domestically, conflicts over the control of natural resources such as oil, gold, and other minerals, compounded with historical political marginalisation and religion, ethnic differences, have exacerbated the conflict, and the negotiations themselves.  

But why the external interference? Because of largely the same chief reason – resources. 

In a March 2025 article published in Chatham House, Senior Research Fellow at Africa Programme Ahmed Soliman and Dr Suliman Baldo, founder, Sudan Policy & Transparency tracker, note that artisanal and small-scale gold mining heavily contributes to the gold that Sudan produces, “most of which ends up in the UAE” through Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and South Sudan – directly and indirectly. 

“The UAE and Egypt have significant influence and support for opposing parties to the civil war,” they say. 

This is backed by a report by the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan. In the report, the experts found that RSF used large proceeds from its pre-war gold business in several industries, creating a network of as many as 50 companies to acquire military equipment and fund operations during the war. 

Further, it found to be credible allegations that the heavy rotation of cargo planes coming from Abu Dhabi International Airport to Am Djarass airport in eastern Chad (with stops in regional countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda) were delivering weapons.

Further, since the beginning of the war, most of the gold that was previously exported to the UAE was now being smuggled to Egypt, the investigation showed. 

The junta in Sudan has accused Kenyan President William Ruto of having commercial interests with the RSF, a claim impeached Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua has reiterated, going to the extent of alleging that the sanctioned force is smuggling gold through Kenya with Ruto’s help.

On diplomacy, the UN experts said, “an excess of mediation tracks and insufficient coordination, as well as entrenched positions of the warring parties combined with competing regional interests, meant peace efforts had yet to stop the war, result in a political settlement or address the growing humanitarian crisis”.  

For effective conflict resolution, therefore, the underlying issues, which are primarily the control of natural resources and the subsequent socio-economic and political marginalisation, need to be addressed – a fair, inclusive and sustainable mechanism of sharing Sudanese resources domestically.

Without that, any mediation process will be tantamount to building a house on quicksand.