In a unanimous ruling on May 15, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court revived a civil rights lawsuit against Houston-area traffic officer Roberto Felix Jr., who fatally shot 24-year-old Ashtian Barnes during a 2016 traffic stop. The Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the case, which had relied on a narrow “moment-of-threat” doctrine, limiting review to the seconds before the shooting. Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires courts to consider the “totality of circumstances,” including an officer’s actions leading up to the use of force, as established in the 1989 Graham v. Connor precedent. This ruling strengthens protections for evaluating California peace officers by establishing an analytical framework that balances the officer’s tactical decisions against the suspect’s threat, while affirming that a genuine and immediate threat can justify deadly force, even if the officer made errors in judgment.

    The Court’s opinion mirrors Penal Code § 835a(e)(3)’s requirement to include "the conduct of the peace officer and the subject leading up to the use of force." Both frameworks reject a narrow focus on the instant of force deployment and mandate a broader contextual analysis. Peace Officers Research Association of California (“PORAC”) and the California Association of Highway Patrolmen (“CAHP”) filed an amicus curiae brief arguing against adopting a rigid “provocation rule” that would automatically negate an officer’s self-defense rights based solely on their prior actions. The Court held that reckless or unreasonable actions (e.g., escalating a minor stop into a deadly encounter) could weigh against the reasonableness of force but do not automatically negate a justification defense. Courts must also consider the suspect’s actions, and the immediacy of the suspect’s threat is often the "most important and fact-intensive" factor.

    The case arose when Felix pulled Barnes over for unpaid tolls, and Barnes drove away. Standing on the doorsill of the vehicle as Barnes sped away, Felix shot him in self-defense. Barnes’ mother, Janice Barnes, sued under Section 1983, alleging excessive force. Lower courts dismissed the suit, citing the Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-threat analysis.

    The Supreme Court rejected this approach, finding it improperly narrowed Fourth Amendment protections. The ruling requires consideration of pre-shooting conduct of both the officer and the suspect in weighing the totality of the circumstances and sent the case back to the lower court for reconsideration. While the decision affirms the definition of totality of the circumstances set forth in AB 392 (Penal Code § 835a(e)(3)), the Court did not determine whether Felix’s alleged escalation of the danger negated the reasonableness of his use of deadly force in response to the threat posed by Barnes’s actions. Instead, it left this question for lower courts to address under the broader totality framework.

    While the decision arguably opens new avenues for police liability, consideration of whether an officer's actions prior to a shooting helped create the danger they later claim justified deadly force was held to be one of many reasonableness factors. Ultimately, the Court issued a narrow ruling about the “timing” of the totality of the circumstances and expressly declined to address the appropriateness of the “Provocation Rule” theory, which had been previously rejected in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez and which the California Legislature had also rejected in amending AB 392. The majority explained:

We do not address here the different question Felix raises about use-of-force cases: whether or how an officer's own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reasonableness analysis. The courts below never confronted the issue, precisely because their inquiry was so time-bound. In looking at only the two seconds before the shot, they excluded from view any actions of the officer that allegedly created the danger necessitating deadly force. So, to use the obvious example, the courts below did not address the relevance, if any, of Felix stepping onto the doorsill of Barnes's car. And because they never considered that issue, it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. The question presented to us was one of timing alone: whether to look only at the encounter's final two seconds, or also to consider earlier events serving to put those seconds in context. (Citations omitted.)

    Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett, provided important guidance for assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force in response to a fleeing vehicle. His concurrence elaborates on the inherent dangers of traffic stops for police officers, particularly when a driver flees, and emphasizes the need for courts to consider these risks when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. Highlighting that traffic stops are “fraught with danger” for officers, he cited historical examples of officers killed or assaulted during such encounters, even for minor violations. He noted that drivers who flee, such as Barnes, amplify these risks by potentially endangering the officer, bystanders, and other drivers. Fleeing in the face of a minor violation may also indicate more serious criminal activity, such as possession of illegal drugs, weapons, or involvement in violent crimes, as illustrated by cases like Timothy McVeigh and Ted Bundy, who were apprehended after traffic stops.

    The concurrence outlines the limited and risky options available to an officer when a driver flees: (1) letting the driver go, which may embolden dangerous behavior and pose public safety risks; (2) pursuing the driver, which can lead to hazardous high-speed chases; (3) shooting at the vehicle’s tires, which is often ineffective and dangerous; or (4) physically intervening, as Felix did by jumping onto the vehicle. Kavanaugh stresses that none of these options are safe, requiring officers to make split-second decisions in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances. His concurrence underscores the need for judicial sensitivity to the real-world risks officers face, ensuring that the reasonableness analysis reflects the high-stakes nature of such encounters.

    Echoing PORAC and CAHP’s arguments, he urges courts to recognize the extraordinary dangers of traffic stops, especially when drivers flee, and to account for the suspect’s flight as a key factor in the “totality of the circumstances.” “The question when a driver flees, therefore, is not merely whether the underlying traffic violation ‘presents risks to public safety’—it is also ‘whether flight,’ and what that flight might indicate or enable, ‘does so.’” In other words, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry includes not only the “severity of the crime” that prompted the stop but also takes into account the suspect's attempt “to evade” the officer “by flight.”

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Barnes v. Felix largely conforms with the arguments raised in PORAC and CAHP’s amicus brief rejecting a rigid provocation rule and that holding the pre-shooting conduct of the officer is merely one factor in the calculus of reasonableness. By avoiding clear guidance on the weight such conduct should be afforded, the Opinion does open the door for continued scrutiny of tactical decisions. However, the concurrence strongly suggests that Felix’s tactics may have been within the range of reasonableness and cautions lower courts against both hindsight analysis and failing to apportion significant weight to the risk posed by a suspect fleeing in a vehicle. In sum, the Court confirmed that for a justification defense to be nullified, the officer’s conduct would need to be so egregious that it outweighs the immediacy of the suspect’s threat in the reasonableness calculus, aligning closely with California’s framework under Penal Code § 835a.

    David E. Mastagni was privileged to file the amicus curiae brief on behalf of PORAC and CAHP.