President William Ruto signed Executive Order No. 1 of 2025 on the Organisation of the National Government in June.

While public attention largely focused on the unprecedented ballooning of the national executive to 56 state departments, a more consequential issue lies concealed beneath the headlines: The order dismantles Kenya’s centre of government, replacing it with a fragmented and incoherent structure — riddled with overlapping mandates and unable to deliver clear policy direction or effective coordination. 

In any modern state, the centre of government is the cockpit — a hub for policy direction, coordination, implementation monitoring, strategic long-term policy development and communication.  Kenya’s de facto centre of government has historically been the Cabinet Office — a constitutional office established under Article 154.

The Constitution assigns its head, the Secretary to the Cabinet, responsibilities such as arranging the business and keeping the minutes of Cabinet. The official also conveys Cabinet decisions to appropriate persons or authorities for implementation. In our system, the President — as Head of Government — is assisted by the Cabinet and the Public Service to execute his mandate. The Constitution thus envisages the Secretary to the Cabinet as the central link between the President and Cabinet on one side, and between the Cabinet and the Public Service on the other.

Ruto’s order effectively hollows out this constitutional office, splintering its core functions among four overlapping centres of power: The Offices of the Prime Cabinet Secretary, the Chief of Staff and Head of Public Service (COSHPS), the Deputy President and State House. This isn’t clever or sophisticated statecraft. It is clumsy and ineffective. Ruto is placing political expediency and patronage above coherent and accountable governance. One wonders whether Ruto’s actions are intentional or whether they stem from an inherent lack of understanding of the philosophy underlying a functional state.

The COSHPS, a statutory office, is the administrative head of the Office of the President, akin to a Principal Secretary. The “Head of Public Service” title emanates from Article 154 (3)(c), which constitutionally tasks the Secretary to the Cabinet with conveying Cabinet decisions to the public service and ensuring their implementation. Yet, Ruto assigns these duties to the COSHPS, Felix Koskei, including transmitting executive directives and policy advisories to the public service for implementation. By reallocating these constitutional duties to a political appointee without constitutional standing, Ruto is violating the Constitution. This effectively amounts to a constitutional amendment by stealth.

In tasking the Secretary to the Cabinet with arranging Cabinet business and communicating decisions therefrom for implementation, the Constitution expects the officeholder to ensure policy positions are properly coordinated and harmonised to avoid divergence or contradictions. This inherently demands constant consultation with Principal Secretaries and senior public servants to ensure that all major policy developments across government align with overarching government priorities and national goals. Accordingly, the Secretary has traditionally convened, chaired and coordinated the PS’s Committees.

Ruto’s order, however, scatters these functions.  It tasks the Prime CS with presiding over the PSs’ Committees, while simultaneously appointing the COSHPS as their convener and coordinator. Additionally, he creates a State Department for Cabinet Affairs (distinct from the constitutional Cabinet Office), domiciled under the Office of the Deputy President, to “oversee implementation of Cabinet decisions”.

Meanwhile, he also tasks the Prime CS with “coordinating implementation of the national government's legislative agenda” — which itself stems from Cabinet decisions. This not only strips away constitutional responsibilities from the Secretary to the Cabinet but also undermines policy coherence, resulting in a chaotic coordination framework. Who, then, actually ensures implementation? Ruto may soon need a coordinator to coordinate the other coordinators.

Nowhere is this absurdity more evident than in PCS Musalia Mudavadi’s overloaded portfolio. As Prime CS, he presides over PSs’ committees, coordinates government’s legislative agenda and oversees public service performance.

As CS for Foreign Affairs, advances Kenya’s diplomacy. In the new order, he is also incharge for Science, Research and Innovation. All three are full-time highly strategic jobs, now compromised by divided attention. No serious state combines foreign affairs with domestic policy coordination (even the AU and OECD advise against it).

Despite Mudavadi’s extensive ministerial experience, his triple ministerial mandate not only overburdens him, it also erodes Kenya’s diplomatic efficacy and undermines government coordination — guaranteeing neglect on all fronts. The results are already showing in the shambles at foreign affairs and in the incoherent, and at times, contradictory policies emerging from Ruto’s government.

Ruto’s order also multiplies mouths - not just for eating. The communication function is now scattered across a government spokesperson, a State House Spokesperson, and a Head of the Presidential Communication Service. When each microphone claims primacy, citizens are left confused. This hodgepodge communication approach has resulted in conflicting, and at times, amateurish, messaging, eroding policy clarity and public trust. On policy advisory, Ruto has assembled a “Council of Economic Advisors” at State House, while retaining Kibaki-era National Socio-Economic Council under the Prime CS. He then creates a delivery unit and an efficiency office at State House but simultaneously tasks the Prime CS with ensuring effective public service delivery across government. And even with a CS for Gender Affairs, Ruto still establishes an Office of the Women’s Rights Adviser at State House. These are just a few examples of the many inconsistencies, duplications, and potential unconstitutionalities in Ruto’s order.

In a government this large, a strong centre is not optional. It is imperative. It ensures that departments communicate, policies align, and that Cabinet makes decisions based on accurate, coordinated information. When multiple power centres issue conflicting directives, civil servants freeze into inertia. Ruto’s executive order offers no operational enhancements or prudent stewardship of public resources as it claims. Kenyans will have to pay more to be governed worse, their taxes underwriting patronage disguised as reform.

Kenya has not always gotten it right—but it has always gotten it better than this. Under President Mwai Kibaki, a lean and functional centre was anchored in the person of Francis Muthaura, who served as both Secretary to Cabinet and Head of Public Service. The result was policy coherence and implementation discipline.

In 2013, President Kenyatta attempted to split the roles by appointing Francis Kimemia as Secretary to Cabinet and Joseph Kinyua as Head of Public Service. But after Kimemia’s dismissal and Parliament’s rejection of Monica Juma to succeed him, Kenyatta recognised the weaknesses of his new model. He quietly reverted to the old model and Kinyua held both roles until Kenyatta’s retirement. This historical lesson now stands in contrast to Ruto’s renewed and expanded fragmentation.

Mugendi Nyaga is an actuary, a management consultant and public policy enthusiast”

X: @Nyagacm