Donald Trump's second term as president of the United States is shaking the global political and economic landscape. However, a pertinent question remains: where is the new version of the "Indo-Pacific" strategy? During Trump's first term that started in 2017, the US formally unveiled its "Indo-Pacific" strategy. Yet, about 50 days into his second term, there has been no official comment regarding the "Indo-Pacific" strategy, particularly concerning its Southeast Asia policy. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has drawn criticism for his apparent lack of familiarity with affairs concerning the Association of Southeast Asian Nations during Senate hearings. The Trump administration's strategic positioning on China-ASEAN relations is still in development. This period of policy formulation presents both challenges and opportunities for the relationship between China and ASEAN.

Examining the evolution of the US global strategy, regardless of whether the Trump administration positions China as a primary strategic competitor or a potential partner, the strategic reality cannot be ignored: Southeast Asia remains a priority region in China's neighborhood diplomacy, and the synergy generated by China-ASEAN relations serves as a model of regional cooperation. The shock wave during Trump's second term will inevitably test China-ASEAN relations. China and ASEAN should prepare in advance, plan collaboratively, respond proactively, turn challenges into opportunities, and transform this into momentum.

This requires China and ASEAN to focus on three areas of work. First, assessing the emerging and potential impacts, including their intensity and scope. Second, proactively examining whether China-ASEAN relations are sufficiently solid and resilient, identifying any gaps and weaknesses, and determining if they can withstand the "shock wave". Third, developing stronger synergy between both sides to build a closer community with a shared future, making it a cornerstone for stability in the Asia-Pacific order.

The new Trump administration will create certain disruptions to China-ASEAN relations. Some analysts maintain a cautious outlook regarding the future direction of China-US-ASEAN relations. First, as the originator of the "Indo-Pacific" strategy, the Trump administration has historically employed a combination of pressure and inducements to maintain distance between Southeast Asia and China. Currently, the US may view Middle East developments and the Ukraine crisis as more pressing issues, which explains why Trump's new "Indo-Pacific" strategy has not yet formally emerged. However, it is reasonable to expect that by the second or third quarter of this year, the Trump administration may redirect its strategic focus toward the Asia-Pacific region, introducing a series of unexpected, unconventional transactional policies.

Second, the Trump administration has already articulated its global tariff policies, which — combined with its "America First "approach in technology, manufacturing and finance — could potentially draw ASEAN countries away from China's economic sphere, directly challenging the long-standing cornerstone role of China-ASEAN economic relations.

Third, the South China Sea issue has consistently served as the US' most effective lever for manipulating and deteriorating China-ASEAN security and political relations. Particularly since President Ferdinand Marcos Jr took office in the Philippines, China-Philippines relations have experienced turbulence, increasing the difficulty of advancing negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN.

Finally, the Trump administration's disregard for multilateralism could impact regional cooperation initiatives from APEC to ASEAN-led East Asian regional cooperation, potentially reducing US engagement and limiting opportunities for China and the US to coordinate strategically through ASEAN platforms.

However, the foundation of China-ASEAN relations is systematic, solid and resilient, continuously making dynamic adjustments based on changing internal and external circumstances. First, both sides have long maintained their commitment to the UN-centered international order and the broader Asia-Pacific regional architecture, jointly advancing comprehensive regional cooperation. Second, they have maintained their status as each other's largest trading partners for many years, with Chinese enterprises demonstrating strong intrinsic motivation to expand into Southeast Asian markets, while ASEAN countries have developed deeply integrated economic complementarity with China. Third, Trump's tariff policies and potential inclination to dismantle the "Indo-Pacific "Economic Framework for Prosperity may draw China and ASEAN economically closer. Fourth, on traditional security issues such as the South China Sea, China and most relevant ASEAN countries have exercised restraint. Meanwhile, in humanitarian assistance for disaster relief and pandemic response, as well as non-traditional security cooperation in areas such as counter-narcotics and anti-telecom fraud, both sides have already developed a cooperation model — forming networks of cooperation that expand from individual cases to systematic collaboration. Building on this foundation, ASEAN and China are gradually replacing the US to become the joint leader in advancing regional cooperation.

Taking a comprehensive view, while China-US relations, US-ASEAN relations and China-US-ASEAN trilateral relations may trend downward during Trump's second term, China-ASEAN relations could potentially strengthen against this backdrop. Indeed, during Trump's first term, China-ASEAN strategic relations experienced comprehensive development. Therefore, China and ASEAN are fully capable of transforming their passive response to the "Trump shock wave" to proactively leverage the momentum of ASEAN-China relations. By utilizing leadership exchanges and existing comprehensive institutionalized cooperation mechanisms, they can comprehensively upgrade China-ASEAN relations, shape a China-ASEAN zone of peaceful development, and establish a cornerstone for stabilizing the Asia-Pacific order.

First, given the universal challenges that US policies pose to China and ASEAN countries, both sides can strengthen hotline communication, strategic dialogue and policy coordination, particularly in macroeconomic policy harmonization. For instance, they might consider strategies for collective resilience against Trump's divide-and-conquer tariff policies.

Second, considering the potential impacts of US policy on East Asian and broader Asia-Pacific cooperation, China and ASEAN can champion multilateralism, open regionalism, ASEAN centrality and an inclusive regional order. They should defend the moral high ground and fundamental architecture of regional cooperation while exploring emerging fields of collaboration and cultivating new forms of regional leadership. These new leadership models encompass green cooperation, digital collaboration, artificial intelligence governance, connectivity enhancement and inclusive regional rule-making.

Third, considering how US policies may impede economic globalization while reinforcing regionalism, China and ASEAN can advance global cross-regional cooperation by expanding horizontal connections. This approach might include promoting China-ASEAN-South Pacific (Australia/New Zealand), China-ASEAN-European Union, China-ASEAN-Gulf Cooperation Council, China-ASEAN-Africa, China-ASEAN-Central Asia, China-ASEAN-Latin America and China-ASEAN-South Asia cooperation frameworks, creating a more expansive and robust global cross-regional cooperative network.

Fourth, in response to the global value fragmentation and geopolitical-economic polarization that US policies may trigger, China and ASEAN can jointly advocate more inclusive, pluralistic value concepts and promote exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations. Examples include promoting ancient Chinese admiral Zheng He's peace culture, Asian-value initiatives and actions, Global South-value initiatives and actions, BRICS-value initiatives and actions, and global governance-value initiatives and actions.

The shared journey of China and ASEAN transcends its initial chapter of "interconnectivity 1.0", ascending toward what might be called "civilizational coexistence 2.0" — a profound harmony between civilizations. While the US remains fixated on constructing walls of separation, China and ASEAN should contemplate how to build bridges that span divides. These bridges have foundations deeply rooted in the fertile soil of digital civilization, with structures inscribed with the wisdom of joint consultation and construction. They lead toward a new regional community of civilizations befitting the 21st century — where diverse traditions flow together like tributaries joining a mighty river. This represents nothing less than a new model of regional cooperation that acknowledges diverse civilizational contributions while creating shared prosperity suitable for contemporary global challenges.

Liu Jingye is an assistant researcher at the Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhai Kun is a senior research fellow of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies and deputy director of the Institute of Area Studies at Peking University. The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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