President Zelenskyy, 1 April 2025.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five. This week, a major Russian missile strike on Kyiv and other regions, an examination of the status of peace negotiations, the potential peacekeeping force, as well as updates on the war on the ground as well as the growing confrontation with China in the Pacific.

As always, I conclude with my top five war and national security reads from the week.

As I wrote this on Sunday morning Kyiv-time, Ukraine came under attack from another large-scale Russian drone, cruise and ballistic missile attack. Initial reporting indicates that just over two dozen Russian missiles were launched at targets inside of Ukraine in two waves. Multiple Shahed drones were also launched.

The missiles appear to have been a mix of Kh 101s, Iskander-Ms and Kalibr missiles. There are indications that around one third were shot down and the remainder hit in or near Kyiv, as well as in Cherkasy, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.

The attack, again, exemplifies Putin’s determination to subjugate Ukraine, and the impotence of the Trump administration in forcing any kind of concession from Russia.

While Russia continues hitting Ukraine, it is also stepping up its misinformation campaign. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov this week claimed that the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire. Further, he described how Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire essentially.

Russia this week also carried out another atrocity against Ukrainian civilians in Kryvyi Rih which killed 19 people, including 9 children, and injured 74 people. The first strike by a ballistic missile was followed up by a strike by Russian Shahed drones which caused further casualties. And while the casualties and damage from Russia’s strikes on the morning of 6 April are yet to be confirmed, it is clear that this was a significant strike that Russia has been preparing for some time.

Russia has stepped up its drone attacks on Ukraine since peace negotiations commenced (if you needed any more evidence that Putin is not serious about peace). February this year saw a 50% increase in drones targeting Ukrainian targets from the previous month, and this increased by a further 7% in March. Compared to this time last year, Ukraine is now being targeted by almost a 700% increase in Shahed drones.

This week, Ukraine hit Russia’s principal manufacturer of fibre optic cables. This is an important strategic target given the significant expansion in both sides use of fibre optic guided drones in Ukraine. It may interrupt the supply of fibre optic cable to Russian drone manufacturers. However, given this is a dual use item, China (one of the world’s biggest manufacturers of fibre optic cable) will probably pick up any drop in Russian supply very quickly. That said, it was still worth attacking the Russian factory.

Fibre optic drones with a 20 km range are now in action on the front lines, according to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Syrsky. In March, drones hit over 77,000 Russian targets—10% more than in February. "Drones have finally caught up with artillery in terms of hit percentage," he stated.

Ukrainian drones also hit a factory that is one of the key manufacturers of explosives for the Russians. A source in the Ukrainian SBU noted that their drones hit the factory 20 times and that production had ceased.

The U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated this week that Russia is running out of time to convince the Americans that it is serious about a peace deal with Ukraine. Rubio noted that the U.S. was losing patience with “talks about talks” and stated that “we will know soon enough, in a matter of weeks, not months, whether Russia is serious about peace or not.” What these comments really indicate, given it is Trump with his hand on the tiller of the Russia relationship, remains to be seen.

European supporters of Ukraine have held another round of discussions about a future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. British and French senior leaders and staff met with President Zelenskyy and Ukraine’s military leadership on 4-5 April to discuss how partner state forces might deploy to Ukraine. As Zelenskyy described after these meetings “there is tangible progress and initial details regarding how a partner security contingent could be deployed.”

Many details are yet to be finalised however, and will depend on when a ceasefire is achieved, the mandate of the peacekeeping force and the posture of Russian forces. This week, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated it is probably best to wait to deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine until after the conclusion of a peace agreement but that countries need to plan now to deploy such a force after peace is achieved.

In the past week, the American intelligence community released its annual threat assessment. It contained, as ususal, a good section on Russia, and made the following key judgements:

None of these judgements should give any confidence that Putin is interested in a short-term ceasefire in the war if he perceives that he has strategic momentum and still has a chance of winning the war. He also knows the the Trump administration is happy to repeat Russian narratives about the war and is unlikely at this stage to place any significant obstacles in Putin’s way as he seeks to achieve his maximalist goals for the war.

The Russians have continued ground combat operations in the north east, east and southern regions of Ukraine during this week. Russia made some gains again this week, although as normal, these were small tacitcal gains that were achieved with significant casualties. Russian forces recently advanced in the following areas:

The most recent statistics about Russian territorial gains for March were released this week. As shown below in the graph prepared by @War_Mapper, Russian gains were at a six month low. That said, they still made gains inside Ukraine as well clearing Ukrainian troops from the majority of the Kursk salient in the month of March. The key Russian axes of advance at the moment are Kursk and Pokrovsk.

In breaking down the last year of Russia’s offensive operations, the first four months was Russian building operational momentum, the next four months saw Russia exploit this momentum with its best gains since 2022, and the past four months have seen Russian losses and Ukrainian adaptation to Russia’s changing tactics slow Russia’s momentum.

And, we are probably now seeing an operational slow down to build stocks, munitions and reposition forces for another offensive push in the middle of 2025. Speculation is building around another Russian offensive when the weather warms up a bit. Such a Russian push would make a lot of sense from Putin’s perspective for the following reasons:

The big news in the Pacific this week was China’s snap joint exercise around Taiwan, Exercise Strait Thunder 2025A. Clearly part of a series to take place over the course of 2025, this exercise demonstrated the growing competence and confidence of the PLA in planning and executing large-scale military activities around Taiwan.

Besides a live-fire training serial, key activities of Exercise Strait Thunder 2025A included the following:

• Assault on maritime & ground targets.

• Blockade on key areas & sea areas.

As I wrote in my assessment of this two-day activity:

Large-scale military exercises such as are designed project an air of inevitability to the region and the world about a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. The real question is when the Chinese might decide that the political and military conditions are just right for them to turn one of these joint exercises around Taiwan into the real thing.

This week the Chief of the Philippines military, General Romeo Brawner, indicated that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would inevitably involve his nation. Now, he is not the person who will decide this (the country’s government will) but his comments are important nonetheless. he described how his country would "inevitably" be involved if neighbouring Taiwan was invaded.

He also warned that China was working to infiltrate his military forces and other national institutions. General Romeo Brawner directed his troops to "start planning for actions in case there is an invasion of Taiwan. Because if something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved."

Finally, the Marine Rotational Force – Darwin has arrived in Darwin this week for its annual deployment. This provides the opportunity for really useful bilateral training between the Australian Army and the Marines. I was the brigade commander for the 1st Brigade in Darwin in 2014-2015, and see this as a close relationship and one that provides many opportunities to enhance U.S.-Australian interoperability on the ground, in the air and with amphibious operations.

*****

Since my last standard edition of The Big Five two weeks ago, I have had a reasonably busy time writing and publishing. I published an article in the Sydney Morning Herald that looked at the drastic changes in the international security environment, and what the Australian government needs to do to adapt.

Next, I published an article that explored the implications of the Signal chat leak in the U.S. administration, followed by a special assessment about Ukraine’s evolving and increasingly capable long-range strike capability.

Finally, in the past 48 hours I published an assessment of China’s Exercise Strait Thunder 2025A, a snap joint exercise by the PLA conducted around Taiwan this week.

*****

It’s time to turn to this week’s recommended readings.

This week, I have included an article from the China Maritime Studies Center about China’s new invasion support barges. There is also an article which challenges the dogma that autonomous systems will supplant humans in warfare, and a good article that argues for the retention of the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon.

As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

In January this year, news emerged of specialized barges being built to support People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over-the-shore logistics for a potential amphibious invasion of Taiwan. In this new report from the China Maritime Studies Center, Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart examine the construction and role these barges, and what it means for the defence of Taiwan. You can read the full report here.

The assumption that the U.S. can succeed in war with more technology, more robots and fewer humans is challenged in this article. As the author notes, “like the Athenians who believed that their great navy could deliver them from the horrors of the battlefield, it is tempting to hope that flying or floating machines will do the same for America today. Athens learned its lesson the hard way.” You can read the article at this link.

Recently, a memo from the U.S. Secretary of Defense appeared to direct the disestablishment of the Office of Net Assement in the Pentagon. Established and overseen by Andrew Marshall over multiple decades, the office undertook some of the fundamental strategic assessments that informed American Cold War defence policy. At the end of the Cold War, it was the Office of Net Assessment that turned to thinking about a future competition with China. In this article, Andrew Krepinevich argues for retaining ONA in its current form, stating that “ONA’s secret recipe has always been its distinctive net assessment methodology that was first developed in the late 1960s and that has been refined and enhanced for over half a century. Once that recipe and tradition are lost, they will not be easily reestablished.” You can read the article here.

One of the lessons of Ukraine has been that we are now in a new era of mass in warfare. While this has some characteristics of previous wars, including mass use (although not always concentrated) of armour, mass fires and industry, there are new characteristics as well. This includes the mass use of autonomous systems and AI. This new article from Modern War Institute explores how existing military institutions might be able to generate mass with new technologies on the 21st century battlefield. You can read the article at this link.

There are over 300 shipyards in China, which build over half of the world’s commercial ships each year. These shipyards build merchant ships but many are also building ships for China’s rapidly expanding navy. This recent report from CSIS examines how foreign companies have poured billions of dollars and key technologies into these dual-use shipyards, which has then accelerated China’s naval modernisation and growth in power. The report explores the impact of this shipbuilding phenomenon and what it means for the security of Pacific nations. You can read the report here.

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