Unfortunately, we must begin this issue of the with the that are, once again, being .

Yesterday (2 April), the Trump Administration unveiled new “” on – in what was dubbed the – in response to the country being “looted, pillaged, raped, plundered” by other nations. – along with , , and - which will come into effect on . While this will undoubtedly have an impact, - as we will explore further in this issue.

. Prior to the announcement, the had acknowledged US tariffs would impact the UK, but said: “We rule nothing out in response”. This morning (3 April), the Prime Minister told business leaders “our intention remains to secure a deal. But nothing is off the table”. found of Brits support the imposition of against the US.

Responding to the US’ announcement, the described the 10% rate as “a good result, relatively” and highlighted as putting the UK in the “best possible position of any country” to have the .

, for the , the – a 2020 found: “Using an annual panel of macroeconomic data for 151 countries over 1963–2014, we find that tariff increases are associated with an . Thus, fears that the ongoing trade war may be costly for the world economy in terms of foregone output growth are justified”.

The latest round of tariffs marks a which continues to with a barrage of and - , , or just - making it impossible to focus on any single issue long enough for sustained scrutiny. This chaos , , and before any one controversy starts to .

In the , we’ve also had the , the for involvement in protests at US universities, and a ratcheting up of the .

Last week, remarked “We need Greenland… ”. Days later, visited a on the territory, to and suggest the US would look to “cut a deal… to ensure the security of this territory”. Vance continued: “the people of Greenland are going to have self-determination. We hope that they choose to partner with the United States… we’re the only nation on earth that will respect their sovereignty and respect their security… We do not think that military force is… going to be necessary”. .

. That it is the and of the now talking in this manner merely reinforces our view that and that we apply to China. In the Upside Down Era® they are now [: As if to reinforce this point, Trump also doubled-down on talk of him seeking a third term - something we have highlighted previously – suggesting he was “not joking” about the idea: “A lot of people want me to do it… There are methods which you could do it”]. And, with the world distracted by the , China has seized the opportunity to ramp up its preparations for .

In response to Vance’s Greenland visit, , condemning the: “hubris, arrogance, amateurishness and irresponsibility” of the US Administration, describing recent events as “truly shocking… a chilling warning to the world”. As a , it may not be surprising that they are , however, it is important to underline that .

‘Signal-gate’ prompted – historically one of the most outlets in the UK – to give their own damning verdict on the behaviour of the current US Administration. On 25 March, US-born , one of the paper’s lead political columnists wrote: “No more room for doubt now. It’s over. … whose side is America on now? The “pathetic” Western countries with which it supposedly shares a democratic tradition or its new friend, Vladimir Putin, with whom it could comfortably carve up the world?”.

It was telling that was - a White House official reportedly justified this by claiming that “sanctions [on Russia] have already rendered ”. It probably will not come as a surprise that and the , despite sanctions. Even if that statement were true, and - who are both subject to - have been hit with tariffs of and respectively. was hit with tariffs.

. As we covered in the last issue, the term soft power (软实力) was originally coined by former and academic .

When the US acts in ways that – as it has in recent weeks and months – this inevitably chips away at the and that . This erosion of soft power is especially damaging because much of the not only on its military and economic might, but coalitions of the willing (and not-so-willing) through , , and a . – as China’s political elite are .

The has spent the last two weeks in and and observes the some in China have about what is happening in the US: “many of those who managed to escape the China of the 1980s and 1990s to become educated in elite western universities and . The , and seemed to them admirable ideas. For such people, what is now happening in America is ”.

. It was cited by in his report to the in , stating that China needed to “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country” (提高国家文化软实力). This concept has and over time in China’s political thinking to now encompass the concept of “” (话语权) as part of an ambition to “” (讲好中国故事).

In this issue of the , we will be through both – and, more recently, decidedly – channels. We will also be looking at the among the US’ erstwhile allies, including . On the , we explore the and of the Government’s . And finally, – the debut of the . Time to see whether you’re a or merely .

to unlock our and to get , our – . Cheers to that.

Without further ado, let’s get started.

The consequences of the US’ - and, by extension, one of its - were once again on this week.

In addition to the 10% baseline rate, it was announced yesterday that the US would “impose an on the countries with which the United States has the ” which will take effect on and remain in-place until “the and is , , or ”. In this world, there is .

The new – and former Governor of the Bank of England – set out, in stark terms, his country’s view of their southern neighbour: “The based on deepening integration of our economies and tight security and military cooperation ”.

Carney’s words seemed to prompt a from Trump – who had consistently referred to Carney’s predecessor as “Governor Trudeau” - referring to him as “Prime Minister Mark Carney” following a call between the two men. and were not included in the new Reciprocal Tariffs announcement, following previous announcements.

, meeting the , and underlining “that the UK and Canada are the ” [: The new ‘Special Relationship’?]. There has been about the possibility of and to on the US, as part of continued efforts to .

Unsurprisingly, the Trump Administration singled out the “pathetic” as one of the “worst offenders”, slapping a new on the trade bloc. This month’s ‘Watching China In Europe’ newsletter provides a rather regarding the run-up to ’s recent :

“Šefčovič… received an urgent message from US Commerce Secretary … encouraging Šefčovič to jump on a plane to the US capital as soon as possible. There was a small window, Lutnick told Šefčovič, for the EU to avert crushing tariffs… After landing in Washington, Šefčovič was informed by Lutnick and US Trade Representative that he had … there could be no negotiations on tariffs… Lutnick was unapologetic… But he did promise Šefčovič… there would be no more surprises… That . When Šefčovič finally landed in Beijing on March 27, he was shocked to discover that Trump had just announced plans to impose 25% tariffs on all cars made outside the United States”.

We may not need to wait long to find out – said on Tuesday (1 April): “Let me be clear: Europe did not start this confrontation, we think it is wrong. But my message to you today is that we have everything we need to protect our people and our prosperity. We have the largest single market in the world, … ”.

The new on comes into effect today (3 April), which will likely impact – including and – as well as other US allies including and [: Meanwhile, it seems some are still fretting about the threats posed by Chinese EVs].

Yesterday, was hit with new Reciprocal Tariffs of - taking total tariffs on the country to an [: Or , no one is quite sure, it seems - including the White House]. Neighbouring fared almost as badly, with a new rate. New tariffs on and were and , respectively.

On Monday (31 March), there was a amid speculation that , and would , prompting breathless talk of a.

To say that relations between these countries’ is would be a [: And this may be a topic we do a ‘deep dive’ on in a future issue] and so this supposed development was seen as a .

In reality, the announcement was [: We may be in the Upside Down Era®, but things have not gone that far… yet] – the Chinese readout describes the agreement in slightly :

“On March 30, the 13^th Trilateral Economic and Trade Ministers’ Meeting between China, Japan, and South Korea was held in Seoul, South Korea. Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, South Korean Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Ahn Duk-geun, and Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Muto Yoji… exchanged views in depth on . Broad consensus was reached. Wang Wentao… noted that the global economy faces mounting downward pressure due to the spread of unilateralism and protectionism. As major economies in the region and globally, the … The three parties agreed to strengthen cooperation under regional and multilateral frameworks… They will discuss , enhance and export control dialogue”.

While this is some way short of any form of ‘’ between the three countries, it is clearly in the economic interests of all to against an increasingly and . However, .

On Sunday (30 March) made his first visit to the country. Speaking during the visit, Hegseth said: “Japan is our indispensable partner in deterring Communist Chinese military aggression… Japan would be on the frontlines of any contingency we might face in the western Pacific”.

- who are facing tariffs. On Tuesday (1 April), , said his country would .

The same day, the (东部战区融媒体中心) published some typically crude propaganda on Chinese social media - helpfully subtitled in both English and Chinese – which described as a “parasite poisoning [and] hollowing out” , who was “courting ultimate destruction”. In addition to this from , the island nation has also been hit withnew from their supposed .

Against this backdrop of – – we will be exploring where China has been attempting to .

On 23 March, (中国发展高层论坛) in Beijing, and delivered a keynote speech.

First established in 2000, the China Development Forum (CDF) was originally conceived by , as a way to bring together Chinese leaders with foreign academics and business people. Since then, the event has grown in prominence, regularly attracting the CEOs of with . The theme of this year’s forum was ‘Unleashing Development Momentum for Stable Growth of Global Economy’.

Since the early days of the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ era, China’s leaders have understood the value of foreign businesses as [: Or not-so-subtle, in the case of people like Elon Musk - who is rumoured to be stepping back from his government role in “late May or early June”, which Musk has dismissed as “fake news”]. This is particularly true in the case of , where business and politics have always been closely intertwined, long before the arrival Trump.

In the 1980s, first-mover US multinationals acted as and as . Attracted by China’s and opportunities, – across a wide range of sectors – were among the , helping to .

but also helped of China as a “responsible stakeholder” in the global system. Even as US-China ties have begun to fray, the interests and actions of major US businesses remain a powerful and force, which has ultimately complicated - some might say undermined – any efforts to meaningfully “decouple” [: It seems the US is now trying to do this in other ways].

. CEOs of global firms frequently develop a sharper grasp of and the needed to navigate them than many professional diplomats or government ministers - and, at the end of the day, .

This was highlighted in the ’s speech last month – in which he advocated for a more : “From now on I have told my Ambassadors that they should give equal weight to their as well as in and politics… Because I know that in 2025, and the team around them . When I need to understand key countries I’ve found it’s often that , that , that , and can ” [: Not sure what this says about the quality of UK diplomats].

. While multinational firms are not formal agents of the state, their global presence means they can be seen as for their and even . However, in the case of China, these firms are frequently drawn into a system that . Whether through , with discriminatory regulations, or on contentious issues, companies seeking access to the Chinese market can be subtly - and sometimes overtly – . In the UK’s case, are the of this – but .

So, while multinationals firms can, in some circumstances, be a , they can also be a point of - exposing the between and . It is not clear whether this tension is fully understood by the Foreign Secretary, given his keenness to .

In contrast, , albeit with varying degrees of success. The UK’s , who are closely involved in the ‘spy’ scandal – and who we have covered previously – are good example of .

In 2023, the celebrated the : “In 1953 Lord Boyd-Orr… took 16 representatives of British companies, including Jack Perry [: Grandfather of the current Chair of the 48 Group Club, Jack Perry Jr], to China to discuss trade. The 1953 ‘Icebreaker Mission’ paved the way for the now fabled 1954 trade mission with 48 businessmen from British companies, which later became known generically as The 48 Group – The ‘Icebreakers’ and whose trail-blazing initiatives have become a long time part of British-Chinese history”.

Today, the is little more than a , and , and yet, an event held marking this anniversary was attended by Chinese Vice President , who read a congratulatory letter from . That a figure like likely enjoys than the or even only underlines – lavishing attention on a marginal group with over UK political discourse, and in doing so, mistaking and for .

Back at the , sought to , as China’s continues to position itself as a , emphasising the country’s commitment to the and :

“In today's increasingly fragmented world with rising instability and uncertainty, it is more necessary for countries to open up their markets and enterprises... Enterprises are not only beneficiaries of globalization but should also become … Decoupling and breaking the chain will only aggravate the crisis, and suppression and containment will ultimately harm everyone… we advocate for fair competition based on , not zero-sum games… If the world returns to the law of the jungle, it will be a step backward in history and a tragedy for humanity.​.. We will , further ease market access for foreign investment... and sincerely welcome enterprises from all countries to invest and develop in China”

A few days after Li’s speech, on 28 March, at a meeting at the Great Hall of the People.

Predictably, – with participants - was second (10), with in third (). Interestingly, (), (), and () were the best-represented sectors among those attending.

The six at the meeting were:

Before 1998, (CBBC) was called the – this organisation was established in 1991 when the , at the instigation of the-then (now ). Both (through its connections to UK business and government) and the (through familial links) lay claim to the and historic role in .

with Xi – giving – to which Xi provided short responses. The seven speakers were:

In his at the meeting, Xi reminded attendees of : “Foreign businesses, especially multinational companies, play an important role and bear . They are expected to, maintain the , protect the international environment for , and advance ”.

Also attending the meeting was member – and Xi’s – , Vice Premier , Foreign Minister , as well as heads of other key Chinese ministries [: ‘Reverse Kissinger’ update for Marco Rubio - Wang Yi has been in Russia this week and addressed this issue directly: “Russian friends may have also noticed that some people, unwilling to remain quiet, have begun to hype the so-called “reverse Nixon strategy”. This not only simplifies international politics into transactions but is also the result of outdated Cold War thinking… The China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership… has withstood the test of [time], as stable as Mount Tai and unshakable”].

. In February, Xi met executives from some of China’s leading firms – including DeepSeek’s and Alibaba’s – as part of ongoing attempts to [: We covered this meeting in the February issue of The Rebrief – exclusively for our Plenipotentiary Ambassadors].

. In May 2023, barred operators of critical information infrastructure from purchasing products made by , citing – as part of a to Chinese tech firms being blacklisted by the . Since then, Micron’s CEO has held multiple senior-level meetings with China’s Ministry of Commerce, as the company quietly works to return to favour with Chinese leaders. .

.

Since 24 March, – real name , nicknamed “甲亢哥” (“Hyperthyroid Bro”) in Chinese – has been from . At the time of writing, Speed has visited Shanghai, Beijing, Zhengzhou (ish), Chengdu and Chongqing (where he met ‘The Chinese Trump’) - presumably with more to come - streaming for to his nearly [: For older readers of the , it might be helpful to think of this as the Gen Z equivalent of Wham!’s visit to China forty years ago this month].

During the streams Speed has taken part in various – including training to become a – trying the , and visiting various , including the . Everywhere he’s gone, he’s been , giving rise to both and interactions with the locals – any of which may have as part of planning for the streams. Regardless of how genuine any of the moments on these streams were – two things are clear.

In China, many have felt a and that a had come to their country and was – challenging and .

Much of the commentary around the visit on Chinese social media has focused on . While this perception is in China, it is certainly true that , or much understanding of the country. As a result, many have expressed , in response to his videos. During Speed’s first stream in he tried the newly released EV: “$70,000 (£54,000) and it’s faster than my Lamborghini?… Woah, bro ain’t no way” - expressing the as many of his Western subscribers.

This has become a on YouTube as hordes foreign travel vloggers have . Beneath the and , there is a genuine level of – largely positive – surprise at what China has to offer foreign travellers.

As part of Speed’s supporting cast have been various – a number of whom have been . This has given rise to some .

Throughout his visit, have been criticised by Chinese viewers for or what was being said. This piece highlights a number of examples where it was felt Speed’s translators were : “The Cultural Missteps of Translating ‘Banana People’ (NB: Derogatory term, used to refer to people who are perceived to be ‘yellow on the outside, white on the inside’). What’s worth pondering is that many of these translation blunders were made by individuals who grew up overseas. Their fluency in code-switching between Chinese and English has ironically become a catalyst for cultural misinterpretation… This phenomenon of ‘cross-cultural middlemen’ is creating a new kind of cultural barrier” ("香蕉人"翻译的文化迷失 值得玩味的是，多位翻车翻译都有海外成长背景。他们熟练切换中英文代码的能力，反而成了文化误读的加速器… 这种"跨文化二道贩子"现象，正在制造新型的文化屏障).

, citing: “China’s growing soft power across key pillars, including Culture & Heritage, Media & Communication, Education & Science, and Sustainability… The country ranked 1^st globally for both the 'ease of doing business in and with' and 'future growth potential' attributes for four consecutive years… China ranks 3^rd globally for ‘rich heritage’, reinforcing its prominent place in shaping global cultural narratives”.

– including investing output – the majority of which has had of China. Chinese media outlets have also experimented with – most (in)famously people like - or sought to act as for [: For more on this, and related topics, we would recommend checking out

]. Once again, it is from these efforts.

Earlier this year, American users - dubbed “TikTok refugees” - flocked to (小红书 RedNote) following the former’s short-lived ban in the US and found themselves . What began as a search for a TikTok alternative became an opportunity for , as users discovered a to those outside the country due to the .

Many US users were struck by the , often centered around . Comments sections briefly became , with US users asking questions about , and – and receiving from Chinese users.

, serving to humanise both sides, however briefly. For many Chinese users, interacting with normal Americans, beyond the geopolitical lens challenged negative stereotypes and built empathy. For Americans, the experience revealed a digitally-savvy, creative, and generous generation of Chinese youth - contrasting with in both and .

In response, the Chinese government, while , quietly , with a number of state outlets praising Xiaohongshu’s role in “building people-to-people understanding” and “showcasing the real China” [: What is meant by the “real China” here is actually a contested and potentially fascinating deep dive in-and-of itself - but one for another time]. While and occasionally , the platform largely became a space where – highlighting how social media can - sometimes - serve as an in an increasingly divided world.

Separately, it has emerged this week that – whose co-founder was an early investor in Facebook and facilitator of Musk’s buyout of Twitter – is , as part of Trump’s efforts to . There is a deadline for the or it will be – once again – . Possibly.

, on a platform that is – it seems the Chinese Government may finally be discovering the to allow space for a more as an for generating .

In a world where China’s consistently fall flat, the most may lie not in but in - to and not - and by simply , the Chinese government may have

In previous issues of the we have – and particularly among the who, for better or worse, , but also among UK’s and .

As you might imagine, this is but we thought we would anyway. So, we have developed the – for short.

The is a framework of , and that we believe is – however, we would like to highlight a couple of at the outset:

While the , we hope the can contribute, in some small way, to a and how some of the ‘gaps’ we have identified previously in the might start to be addressed.

It goes without saying that language proficiency is an important skill, and many would weight it more heavily, but we have considered the extent to which these skills would be used on a day-to-day basis over the course of 20-30 year career in foreign affairs/diplomacy, much of which would likely be spent in policy roles in the UK, even if those roles were China-facing.

We believe professional experience of working in/with China is critical and this is where much of the real ‘learning’ will take place.

: Like language skills, there is simply no substitute for time spent ‘on the ground’. We also recognise the value in getting outside of the main cities, to better understand the country’s vast interior. It is also important to recognise that China changes fast and previous experience ages remarkably quickly.

: Important and valuable, particularly in the early stages of a career in foreign affairs/diplomacy, but it is important to supplement this with more practical experience.

: Effective China expertise relies not just on academic knowledge but on real, ongoing relationships with people who shape, implement, and experience policy in China. This category assesses depth, regularity, and diversity of engagement with Chinese stakeholders in government, business, academia, media, and civil society - both inside and outside China.

: This is related to language skills, but with an emphasis on effective and proactive use of those skills.

: As we’ve already highlighted, China changes fast. Some of these changes will be imperceptible if you’re outside the country for an extended period. Conversely, some changes are so gradual, that they will only be perceptible if you have left, and then return to the country after a period of time. This is arguably one of the hardest categories to quantify but here we define ‘eras’ is distinct periods, defined by major socio-economic shifts, e.g., pre-/post-WTO accession (2001), pre-/post-Beijing Olympics (2008), pre-/post-Xi era (2012), pre-/post-COVID (2020).

: Much of this should naturally come with experience, but not necessarily, so we thought it important to make a standalone category.

: This is related to many of the categories above, but we believe it is an under-appreciated aspect of becoming a ‘China hand’. This is all-the-more critical in the Upside Down Era® where old geopolitical assumptions and frames of reference are crumbling before our eyes – with even very recent commentary and analysis becoming irrelevant almost immediately.

• – No visit post-COVID, missing a critical inflection point in China’s economy, governance, and social environment.

• – No recent engagement with contemporary China, no visit in 5+ years, or relies on outdated second-hand sources.

• – No visit in 10+ years or engagement with modern Chinese sources; perspective likely disconnected from current reality.

• – No visit post-2012 (Xi era), and no alternative means of updating knowledge. Views likely anchored in a completely different political, economic, and societal landscape.

• – subscriber

• – Plenipotentiary Ambassador

So, you’ve CHBCHB and fancy getting involved in the UK-China space – well, we’re afraid we may have some bad news for you.

Even if you manage to get a job in the Civil Service, getting anywhere near a China-facing role in the Foreign Office (who rarely, if ever, recruit externally) or Cabinet Office (where much of the core decision-making on China now takes place) – you will need to overcome the next major hurdle: national security vetting.

As the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change explains: “current vetting procedures… often rule out by default applicants with close family ties to China [and] almost all groups with the deepest linguistic and cultural expertise – BNOs, those with family in China and those who have spent significant time in China – find it extremely difficult to get the highest levels of clearance… As a relatively small number of UK citizens spend time in China to begin with, and security processes tighten for those who do, there is a risk that Whitehall struggles to incorporate real China knowledge into a robust challenge function and instead relies primarily on specialists trained solely in-house, many of whom have limited or no in-country exposure and are often trained on the same information sets”.

In short, if you’ve spent a significant amount of time living, working, or studying in China, learning the language to a high degree of proficiency, and cultivated extensive personal or professional networks with Chinese people – at present, it is highly likely that this experience will significantly reduce your chances of being able to obtain what is called Developed Vetting (DV) – a prerequisite for the vast majority of China-related roles across government.

Both the Foreign Office and Cabinet Office require DV clearance as standard – requiring candidates to have spent at least 5 years out of the last 10 physically resident in the UK to be eligible to even apply. For more sensitive roles this can be increased to 7 years or more. Given the importance of time spent ‘on the ground’, it is not hard to see why these requirements might be a problem.

On 3 June 2016, during the Brexit referendum campaign, the-then Justice Secretary Michael Gove told Sky News: “I think the people in this country have had enough of experts... from organisations with acronyms saying that they know what is best and getting it consistently wrong”.

Eight years after Gove’s comments, on 17 May 2024, David Lammy gave a speech at the Institute for Government, in which he set out his vision for the Foreign Office if Labour won the General Election: “This geopolitical moment requires fresh ideas… The root of diplomatic expertise will always be deep understanding of host countries and regions… For too long the foreign office has been seen by the outside world and the rest of Government as generalist dilettantes. Once again, Michael Gove was wrong. In a modernised Foreign Office, as in wider government, we need more experts, not fewer… If we are to understand China, we need serious Chinese experts, both here and in Beijing”.

As the Foreign Office is unable – or unwilling – to bring in external experts, it becomes entirely reliant upon cultivating that expertise internally, from within its existing cadre of “generalist dilettantes”. It is unclear what has happened to the previous Government’s China Capabilities Programme but we are glad to see that the Great Britain-China Centre (GBCC) has not only survived Liz Truss’ Premiership but continues to support a number of China capabilities initiatives.

Late last month, the GBCC opened applications for their 2025 Future Leaders Programme, which aims to “prepare the UK’s future political, government and business leaders to tackle the challenges and meet the opportunities accompanying China’s rise”.

The target audience for the programme is “mid-career policy- and decision-makers from across Westminster, Whitehall, think tanks and UK business… The Programme is geared towards busy mid-career professionals, with cohorts of 25-30 participants joining short, immersive courses in Oxford [The Editor: Where else] and London. This is complemented by a broad range of continuous deep dives and additional opportunities for engagement, which are open to both participants and the growing number of alumni”.

If this sounds like something you would be interested in - and, if you’re reading the China House Brief, it may well be - the closing date for applications is 4 May 2025.

We have often questioned the Foreign Office’s ability to adapt to the realities of the new Upside Down Era® of geopolitics – but when it comes to ‘China expertise’, it isn’t just struggling to keep up; it is actively tying the UK’s hands behind its back, effectively blindfolding decision-makers, by ensuring the very expertise it needs is locked out by design.

In the aforementioned speech, one of the Foreign Secretary’s “guiding principles” for the Foreign Office was “openness”. It is difficult to see how the Foreign Secretary’s vision of a “new generation of diplomatic excellence” can ever be realised while everything about the department’s processes, structures, and priorities appears to be antithetical to this simple principle.

On 26 March, there was a Westminster Hall debate on ‘UK-China Relations’. Did MPs take the opportunity to discuss the possible role of China in resolving the Ukraine crisis? How the UK should use our own trading relationship with China to hedge against US tariffs and threats? Or perhaps China’s Jingye Group’s request for £1bn of state support to keep British Steel afloat?

No, of course not. Predictably, it was another bleak hour-and-a-half of China sceptic MPs rehashing well-worn talking points, with no meaningful insights or conclusions.

Topics included the UK’s economic “dependence” on China, particularly in sectors like renewable energy and Electric Vehicles, and the associated national security risks. Discussions covered China’s human rights record, with specific references to the repression in Xinjiang, Tibet, and the erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong, as well as Jimmy Lai’s continued imprisonment. The debate also touched upon China’s global influence and the need for the UK to balance economic interests with ethical considerations in its foreign policy.

The session felt like little more than a blow-by-blow reprise of the ‘Urgent Questions on China’ debate held following the Foreign Secretary’s return from Beijing last year. Disappointingly, there appeared to be no discernible shift in MPs’ perspectives, the scope of their questions, or the substance of the points raised in the five months since then.

Naturally, friend of the China House Brief, Sir Iain Duncan Smith was involved, along with fellow IPAC members - Luke Taylor, Gregory Stafford, and Connor Rand - as well as two members of the Foreign Affairs Committee - Richard Foord and Edward Morello.

Interestingly, on the 27 March, the Foreign Affairs Committee opened a new enquiry into ‘The UK Government’s China Audit’ which will “examine the process and outcomes of the China Audit, and how these support UK national interests. It will also explore the Government’s long-term approach to China, and how it intends to ensure consistency across Government, business and academia towards engagement with China”. The enquiry has an open call for evidence with a deadline of 5 May 2025, which would suggest we may see the audit itself published before, or shortly after, that date.

The only vaguely interesting moment of the aforementioned debate was a few additional details about the audit from Indo-Pacific Minister Catherine West: “a team in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has been conducting the China audit. It has consulted widely across Government and with a wide range of external stakeholders [The Editor: Who?], including with some honourable Members in this room, who have been to see the Foreign Secretary to discuss their concerns. That is already proving valuable in developing policies and planning engagement… I can certainly confirm that the audit will be made public before the end of the spring”.

Elsewhere in the House, on 1 April, the Home Office published updated guidance on the long-awaited Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), which will come into force on 1 July 2025. The scheme aims to: “protect the safety and interests of the UK by improving the understanding of activity taking place in the UK at the instruction of a foreign state or certain foreign state‑controlled organisations”.

However, Sir Iain is unlikely to be happy as it seems China has not been included in the ‘Enhanced Tier’ of the scheme. Announcing the implementation of FIRS, Security Minister Dan Jarvis said: “Last month, I set out our intention to specify Iran under this tier of the scheme. And I can announce today that we will also specify Russia under the scheme”. China was not mentioned.

As we explained previously, the broad exemptions built into both the Enhanced Tier and the wider scheme mean FIRS is unlikely to seriously disrupt covert foreign influence operations – though that’s unlikely to trouble the most ardent China sceptics in Parliament. Therefore we should expect this to become a common line-of-attack in future Parliamentary debates on China.

Who will be the first MP to subscribe to the China House Brief? Place your bets now.

The China House Brief will return on 17 April 2025.

Thank you for reading.