But what does the law actually say—and can President Mahama be impeached?

Article 69 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution outlines the process:
A sitting President may be removed from office for:

If, as publicly indicated by the President himself, both the President and Vice-President were simultaneously outside the country—with the Vice-President receiving medical care and no formal Acting President appointed—this may constitute a .

That provision requires the Vice-President to perform presidential functions in the President’s absence. Where , constitutional continuity demands that to maintain lawful executive authority.

Without such delegation, , raising concerns under , which declares that .

Impeachment is not merely legal—it is profoundly political. Here’s why:

This means that unless , and at least one Independent or NPP member joins them, impeachment is procedurally dead on arrival.

The , plays a pivotal role. Article 69(2)(a) mandates that he must refer any notice of impeachment to the Chief Justice within 7 days.

However, speakers can delay through procedural objections or by questioning the admissibility of motions—creating .

An —depending on their independence and procedural stance—would be constitutionally bound to establish a tribunal if the Speaker refers the matter. However, the real procedural gatekeeper remains the , whose political alignment with the NDC could influence the pace and posture of any referral, making fast-tracking unlikely.

Once the matter reaches the , the formation of a is mandatory. However, reaching that stage requires a compliant Speaker and a clean procedural motion—rare in politically charged climates.

Once the matter reaches the Chief Justice, the formation of a under Article 69(2)(b) is mandatory and largely procedural. The Chief Justice has no discretion to reject or delay this step once a has been made by the Speaker.

However, —and this is where the Speaker becomes pivotal.

By “compliant Speaker,” we refer to a under Article 69(2)(a), which requires them to . In practice, however, a Speaker—particularly one aligned with the ruling party, such as the current NDC Speaker—may:

This sort of procedural “slow-walking” is often , yet it can effectively derail impeachment efforts before they even begin—.

The implication is significant: even if there is legal merit to an impeachment motion, and even if the one-third MP threshold is met, the Speaker’s role as gatekeeper means that the matter may . In such cases, constitutional accountability is subordinated to and , eroding public confidence in Parliament’s neutrality as a constitutional check.

The impeachment of President Mahama is if the allegations regarding absence and executive vacuum are substantiated. But the , combined with institutional alignment and party loyalty, makes actual removal .

For the real battleground is not in Parliament—but in . In the coming weeks, watch not just for legal filings, but for how the .

The real battleground is no longer Parliament—. Instead, it has shifted to the , the , and the .

In high-stakes constitutional disputes such as this, the . Equally important is the —how the public perceives what has occurred, and whether institutions are seen to be acting in good faith.

If the Speaker delays referral, or the executive appears to bypass constitutional checks, the , legal commentators, and the media to .

Moreover, the —not just to resolve legal ambiguity, but to in a moment that threatens to destabilize institutional trust. Public pressure, amplified through strategic litigation, social mobilization, and civic education, may be the left to demand accountability when the formal parliamentary route is procedurally locked.

So in the coming weeks, do not look only for writs and rulings. Because ultimately,

This moment is not isolated—it is the latest domino in a chain reaction that threatens the very .

It began when the then-opposition , prompting judicial review of a matter long understood to be political, not legal. The , raising early alarms about the judiciary’s neutrality in political contests.

Fast forward to the NDC’s return to power: the judiciary is now facing its own internal reckoning. The , and a removal process has been initiated under a . An , casting a long procedural shadow over any pending constitutional references, especially those that might relate to presidential conduct or separation of powers.

Now, the opposition—ironically the same NPP that once invoked the Court to check Parliament—is considering impeachment proceedings against President Mahama for allegedly breaching the Constitution while abroad.

These are not isolated events. Together, they represent the systemic erosion of the separation of powers—with each arm of government weaponizing its authority depending on who holds political power.

Ghana stands at a constitutional inflection point.

The traditional guardrails—judicial independence, parliamentary autonomy, and executive restraint—are being hollowed out by partisan calculation. The precedent being set is dangerous: that constitutional boundaries are flexible, dependent on electoral outcomes, and reversible depending on who sits in the chair.

If this trend continues, future Chief Justices will be suspended at political convenience. Speakers will be challenged for their rulings by whichever party is out of power, and Presidents will either override or be overridden, depending on which faction dominates the court of the day.

This is not merely an institutional crisis—it is the slow corrosion of constitutional culture.

If left unchecked, Ghana may be headed for a permanent collapse of institutional independence, where no branch of government truly checks the other. Instead, we will see rotating invasions—each new majority using the Constitution as a tool of conquest, rather than a restraint on power.

What we are witnessing may be a watershed moment, yes. But if the nation does not course-correct, it will become an eternal moment—one in which the idea of checks and balances ceases to exist.

Constitutionalism is not sustained by laws alone, but by restraint, tradition, and mutual respect among institutions. The real test is not what each branch can do—but what it chooses not to do.

Because once all three branches forget their boundaries, it’s not just the Constitution that collapses—it’s the Republic that follows.

By Amanda Clinton

Amanda Clinton is a Ghanaian lawyer, legal commentator, and Founding Partner of The Law Office of Clinton Consultancy. She has advised across constitutional, commercial, and international law matters and frequently contributes to national discourse on legal and governance issues.