Ghana is widely recognised for having one of the most enduring democracies in Africa, a remarkable achievement that has not been easily attained. This has largely been due to the continuous resolution of tensions surrounding the design of the country’s democratic institutions.

Although some argue that this progress has been in decline in recent times, a quick scan of social and traditional media, alongside recent challenges of decisions made by the Legislature, Executive, and even the Judiciary, may suggest otherwise.

As engagement with democratic processes increases, so too does the improvement of institutional design and governance. After all, this has been the year of institutionalists in governance and prosperity.

In this context, President H.E. John Dramani Mahama, in fulfilling his constitutional duties upon assuming office, nominated Dr. Johnson Asiama, the former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana, as the next Governor of the Central Bank.

This nomination was made on January 31, 2025. On the same day, it was reported that the then-Governor, Dr. Ernest Addison, had begun his leave on February 3, 2025, ahead of his planned retirement at the end of March 2025. On February 4, 2025, it was widely reported that Dr. Asiama had already resumed his duties.

This prompted a challenge from the Minority in Parliament, questioning the legitimacy of Dr. Asiama’s assumption of office before receiving confirmation from the Council of State. Through their Minority Leader, they asserted that Dr. Asiama should "refrain from engaging in official duties at the Bank of Ghana until he is duly approved by the Council of State" but suggested he could attend briefings in the interim, outside of a formal assumption of office.

It is respectfully submitted that this view promoted by the Minority is inaccurate. The process may be more nuanced than the Minority suggests, as outlined below.

Article 183(4)(a) of the Constitution of Ghana (1992) specifies that the Governor of the Bank of Ghana is to be "appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State for a period of four years." This appointment is subject to the provisions of Article 285, which ensures that a person appointed as Governor, and who will also chair the board of the Bank, cannot be in service at the time of their appointment.

This is further reinforced by Section 17(1)(b) of the Bank of Ghana Act, 2002 (Act 612), as amended by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 918), which also provides for the appointment of the Governor and Deputy Governors by the President in consultation with the Council of State.

However, both. Therefore, the claim that Council of State approval is needed is misleading and inaccurately attributes powers to the Council that are not conferred by law. It is crucial to ensure that our institutions operate within the framework of what the law permits.

The Minority may have conflated "consultation" with "approval," a distinction that is critical in this context. The appointment process for Supreme Court Justices, for example, does require the advice of the Judicial Council, consultation with the Council of State, and approval by Parliament (Article 144(2) of the Constitution). However, such requirements are not mirrored in the case of the Bank of Ghana Governor. While both processes involve consultation with the Council of State, the comparison with Supreme Court appointments is not valid. The Constitution does not impose similar requirements for the appointment of the Bank of Ghana Governor.

The Supreme Court has provided a definitive interpretation of what consultation means in this context. It simply refers to seeking advice and engaging in discussions with the Council of State. Such consultations do not constitute binding advice that would compel the President to act according to the Council’s views. Indeed, the President is not obliged to accept the Council's recommendations if they are contrary to his decision.

Therefore, the Minority’s concern that a potential mishap might occur if the appointed governor continues in his duties before being approved by the Council of State does not hold legal merit. The President, under the Constitution, does not share this appointment power with anyone, not even Parliament.

The non-binding nature of the consultation does not allow the President to bypass the requirement to consult with the Council of State. Such an act would be unconstitutional, as per Article 2(1) of the Constitution. The President must consult with the Council of State, but he is not bound by their advice.

Additionally, the President has significant influence over the Council of State due to his role in appointing the majority of its members under Article 89 of the Constitution. While this does not suggest that the Council lacks independence, it is likely that the President's appointees will align with him on most matters, including nominations for critical roles.

The Council of State plays a crucial role in the consultation process, but its composition can take time. For instance, the Electoral Commission opened nominations for regional representatives on January 23, 2025, and the elections are scheduled for February 11, 2025.

As the Council is not fully constituted, one might question whether this delays the President’s ability to make appointments that require consultation with the Council.

It is submitted that such a procedural gap should not prevent the President from appointing a Governor to fill a leadership void in an important institution like the Bank of Ghana. Section 20(2) of the Bank of Ghana Act, 2002 (Act 612), as amended by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 918), allows the First Deputy Governor to act in the absence of the Governor.

However, this provision does not address the situation where there is no substantive Governor. Thus, the President’s power to appoint a new Governor should not be delayed due to procedural gaps in the composition of the Council of State.

The appointment of the Bank of Ghana Governor by the President, pending consultation with the Council of State, is constitutionally valid. The Constitution and relevant statutes clearly vest the power of appointment in the President, with consultation being a procedural step.

The absence of a fully constituted Council of State should not hinder the President’s ability to appoint leaders to critical positions, especially in vital institutions like the Bank of Ghana.

While the Minority’s concerns highlight the importance of due process, their interpretation risks causing unnecessary delays and inefficiencies in governance.

The appointed Governor’s assumption of duties, even during the pendency of consultations, aligns with the pragmatic application of constitutional provisions, ensuring the continuity of the Bank’s operations and accountability for actions undertaken during this period. This approach balances legal fidelity with the practical demands of governance, reinforcing Ghana’s democratic institutions while maintaining the integrity of its constitutional framework.

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