ON February 15, during the 38th summit of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African leaders elected Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the foreign minister of Djibouti, as the new chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), the executive branch of the continental body.

He prevailed over Raila Odinga, the former prime minister of Kenya, and Richard Randriamandrato, Madagascar’s former minister of foreign affairs.

Youssouf has been Djibouti’s foreign minister since 2005 and takes over from Moussa Faki Mahamat, the former prime minister of Chad, who has served two consecutive four-year terms as the leader of the AUC.

In his official manifesto, he has committed to advancing governance and democracy, strengthening institutional capacity, and fostering peace and security, among other goals.

Youssouf assumes office at a precarious time in Africa and is expected to leverage his diplomatic expertise especially to address the conflicts raging in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Youssouf appears poised to champion peace and work for substantial positive changes in countries across the continent in the coming years.

But his success is less than guaranteed, as African leaders are generally hesitant to relinquish significant power to the AU and its affiliated organisations.

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) released a report in March 2022, which revealed that as of July 2021, just 7 percent of its judgements had been fully complied with, 18 percent had been partially complied with, and a substantial 75 percent had not been complied with at all.

Additionally, the report mentioned that several African countries have made it clear to the Executive Council that they will not adhere to the Court’s decisions.

Perhaps this explains why last year’s ACHPR report omitted these statistics. Most African leaders resist the imposition of rigorous external oversight measures – critical interventions that their countries sorely need to prevent war and instability.

Hence, it is less than certain what Youssouf might accomplish in the next four years.

The successes and failures of his predecessor, Moussa Faki Mahamat, may offer some clues as to what the new AUC chair could expect to achieve in the coming period.

At a ceremony to mark the official start of his term on March 14, 2017, Mahamat was oozing with confidence.

He had pledged to “make the Commission a tool capable of translating into reality the vision of our leaders and the aspirations of our peoples”, and “to silence the guns and realise an Africa free of conflicts by 2020”.

Eight years later, his administration’s performance has been marked by a combination of limited accomplishments and many unresolved challenges.

Mahamat was instrumental in the mediation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), a landmark peace treaty signed between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) on November 2, 2022, in Pretoria, South Africa.

This accord brought an end to the devastating 2020-2022 Tigray war. Despite this crucial achievement, however, he was unable to “silence the guns” in the conflicts in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia and Mozambique – although it was not for lack of effort.

In his address to the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on February 17, 2024, Mahamat voiced his profound frustration with the illiberal actions of African leaders, who he chose not to name, seemingly in a spirited attempt to rationalise his various failures.

He pointed to the ongoing conflicts on the continent, the resurgence of military coups in Central and West Africa, and the overwhelming unwillingness of certain AU member states to conduct elections that are regarded as credible.

On the latter, he rightly said, “Instead of being joyful modes of peaceful transfer or maintenance of power, elections have become, through the extent of their irregularities, factors for deepening crises.”