Turkey is intensifying its engagement in Africa’s mining sector, eyeing strategic reserves of critical raw materials (CRMs) through bilateral agreements and new ventures in several African countries. While Ankara is not yet a major player in global critical mineral markets, it has embarked on an ambitious strategy driven by its energy and industrial policy goals to reduce import dependence and secure inputs. This strategic push for access to Africa’s minerals unfolds amid rising global competition for CRMs. For Turkey, access to these minerals is becoming crucial – not only for technological innovation, industrial strategies, energy and digital transformation, but for its broader strategic autonomy. Yet supply chains, dominated by China and fractured by geopolitical conflicts, remain fragile.

Turkey’s late but assertive entry into the CRM markets is complicated by these tensions. Its growing role has also heightened competitive dynamics, especially in regions where mineral access intersects with defence cooperation. In the Sahel, countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which have distanced themselves from traditional partners like France and the European Union (EU), have increasingly engaged Turkey for military cooperation, arms deals and mining partnerships, particularly in gold and energy sectors. Similarly, in the Horn of Africa, Ankara’s presence in Somalia and growing economic and defence ties with Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti intersect with United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi interests, notably around port infrastructure, military training and energy access. As Turkey couples domestic mining reforms with strategic outreach in Africa, its ambition goes beyond resource acquisition: It seeks to reshape its geopolitical footprint in a shifting global order.

A dual-track strategy: domestic reform and international sourcing

Turkey’s pursuit of critical minerals is shaped by growing domestic industrial demand and strategic engagement abroad. Key sectors such as defence, electric vehicles (EVs) and renewables are driving this push. The defence industry, a priority for Ankara’s strategic autonomy, depends heavily on rare earth elements (REEs) and specialised alloys used in advanced weaponry, aerospace systems and batteries. Meanwhile, the burgeoning EV sector – anchored by Turkey’s Automobile Joint Venture Group (TOGG) initiative – is ramping up demand for lithium, nickel and battery inputs. In response, Turkey launched its first lithium-extraction plant in 2020, targeting 600 tons of annual production from boron waste. Simultaneously, Ankara’s renewable energy expansion has heightened the need for REEs such as high-purity silicon for wind turbines and silver for solar panels, linking mineral access to national energy goals.

It would seem that Turkey is well positioned to meet these demands. The country has substantial deposits of tungsten, cobalt and graphite and a recent discovery of REE deposits in Eskişehir-Beylikova and Malatya-Kuluncak is touted as the world’s second largest. In addition, the country controls 70% of global boron. However, current production is insufficient to meet growing industrial needs. This, combined with the country’s lack of many critical minerals, reinforces Turkey’s dependence on imports and exposure to global supply chain disruptions.

Confronted with limited domestic reserves and rising demand, Turkey has adopted a dual-track strategy to secure critical minerals: (i) enhancing domestic capacity and (ii) expanding international partnerships, particularly in Africa. Domestically, Ankara is advancing reforms to boost the value addition of its mining sector. In 2020, the government established a dedicated REE Research Institute to develop extraction and processing know-how and launched the lithium-from-boron project to tap unconventional domestic sources. The government has prioritised converting raw ore into high-value products, such as REEs, within Turkey, potentially positioning the country among the top global REE producers. To support this, Turkey offers incentives like tax breaks, infrastructure support and state-backed financing, alongside the creation of specialised entities such as MTA International Mining Inc. for overseas ventures.

In parallel, Turkey is actively pursuing foreign sources of supply, especially in Africa. Since 2016, Ankara has signed energy and mining agreements with at least 17 African countries, although only eight have been ratified. The agreements are aimed at the facilitation of technical cooperation, capacity building and joint exploration. Recent high-level political visits have often included mining on their agenda, and several forums like the Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum, the Istanbul Energy Forum and the Istanbul Natural Resources Summit provide platforms for deal-making.

Modalities of Turkish engagement in Africa’s CRM sector

Turkey’s evolving presence in Africa’s mining and energy sectors reveals a set of distinct but complementary modalities. The first, more traditional modality focuses on direct extraction and export of minerals, often through wholly or majority-owned Turkish ventures. This model targets Turkey’s strategic needs and commercial gains in global commodity markets. Examples such as Turkish MNG Gold’s operations in Liberia, Hacıoğlu Gold Mining’s activities in Kenya, CTC Mining’s strategic aluminum investments in Sierra Leone and exploration in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali reflect this pattern. In these cases, Turkish investments are less embedded in local value chains but are crucial for supplying inputs to Turkey’s domestic industries and positioning Turkish companies in high-demand global markets.

Beyond extraction, Turkish firms have embedded themselves across upstream and downstream production and have reintegrated outputs into Turkish and regional value chains. This modality combines security of supply with developmental co-benefits for host countries. In Algeria, Tosyalı Holding’s integrated steel plant, Africa’s largest, transforms raw ore into export-ready products, reducing import reliance and positioning Algeria as a regional hub. Similar projects, like a USD 200 million Senegalese steel mill and iron ore operations in Angola, similarly advance Turkey’s industrial ambitions while bolstering African infrastructure, jobs and trade. Beyond metals, the appliance manufacturer Arçelik has deepened its manufacturing footprint in Africa through acquisitions like South Africa’s Defy and a new Egyptian industrial plant, weaving local suppliers of plastics and steel into its global networks. Meanwhile, energy companies like Aksa and Karpowership contribute to grid stability in West and Central Africa while Turkish companies benefit, in turn, from African countries’ industrial growth.

Furthermore, Turkish firms have been seen to actively engage in high-volatility regions, coupling mining investments with visible infrastructure projects and security cooperation and blurring the lines between development and defence. For instance, following Niger’s decision to request the withdrawal of French and US military personnel and to revoke mining contracts held by French and Canadian companies involved in uranium extraction, Turkey secured a series of infrastructure, defence and mining agreements with the country between 2019 and 2020. It also delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to Niger in 2022 and have generally expanded cooperation in energy, mining, intelligence and defence. A comparable trajectory is unfolding in Sudan, where Turkey has reportedly supplied drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces amid the ongoing conflict, and discussions are underway regarding the return of Turkish mining firms. In Ethiopia, arms deals and security cooperation are also accompanied by mining deals.

Ankara rhetorically positions its engagement as sustainable, mutually beneficial and development-oriented, emphasising the prioritisation of local development, technology transfer and environmental responsibility. State-owned entities such as ETİ Maden and MTA International have been rebranded as public actors tasked with promoting responsible mining, enhancing technical capacity and facilitating international partnerships – a role explicitly articulated by the Energy Ministry. ETİ Maden’s pledge to ‘develop sustainable projects, not just extract resources’ aligns with official narratives of ‘strategic, tech-driven partnerships’. While this remains partly aspirational, it reflects Turkey’s attempt to distinguish itself from other extractive competitors and respond to Africa’s expectations of tangible development progress.

Turkey is also increasingly signalling its intent to pursue trilateral and triangular cooperation in critical minerals, framing itself as a bridge between African resources and global markets. Ankara has emphasised its readiness to engage in collaborative ventures with all countries, especially in Africa, positioning itself as a neutral yet assertive partner in multilateral mining initiatives. As part of this modality, Turkey has expressed growing interest in cooperative frameworks, involving third-party states or private actors to jointly develop projects, particularly in Africa. This approach seeks to combine Turkish commercial reach with external capital, technological expertise or diplomatic leverage. Recent discussions between Turkish stakeholders and AzerGold concerning potential mining collaboration in Africa illustrate this trend. Such joint ventures aim to pool resources and broaden project scope while bolstering Ankara’s reputation as a pragmatic and adaptable actor in an increasingly competitive global minerals landscape.

Trilateral dynamics: Turkey, the EU and African states

As Turkey expands its footprint in Africa’s critical minerals sector, the EU emerges as a significant actor, given its long-standing institutional presence and current mineral strategies in the region. While both actors share goals like diversifying supply chains and promoting sustainable development, their approaches operate in near-isolation: The EU prioritises binding environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards through frameworks like the 2008 Raw Materials Initiative, the 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act and Memoranda of Understanding on minerals with countries like Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zambia and Rwanda.

Turkey, on the other hand, only formalised its first CRM list in early 2025, lagging behind the EU’s structured prioritisation. The country employs a pragmatic, commercially oriented approach with fewer regulatory constraints: The legal framework for mining in Turkey has been amended 25 times between 1985 and 2020 to fast-track permits, attract foreign investors and expand extraction. This has sparked opposition over lax environmental standards, particularly in waste and water management, worker safety failures and community concerns. Similar operative patterns in Africa risk duplication, fragmented standards and missed opportunities for the cohesive partnerships Turkey is seeking with both African nations and the EU. This threatens to undermine the country’s geopolitical credibility.

Such challenges aside, opportunities for strategic convergence may be emerging. Turkey’s 2024 accession to the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a US- and EU-led initiative to secure critical mineral supply chains, signals tentative alignment with Western frameworks. Turkey’s domestic push, involving partnerships with China in mining and other Chinese firms like CATL, BYD and Chery, as well as infrastructure plans for rare earth processing in Eskişehir, highlights its ambition to move beyond raw material extraction toward domestic value retention.

However, these efforts remain bilateral and nationally focused. They have yet to leverage opportunities for trilateral cooperation involving African resource producers. To move from parallel strategies to structured collaboration, the EU and Turkey should consider using the MSP as a platform for targeted trilateral initiatives with African member states, such as the DRC, Zambia and Namibia. The partnership could serve as a neutral, flexible framework to co-develop pilot projects in extraction, refining or recycling of REEs, combining European ESG and financing standards with Turkey’s commercial agility and Africa’s resource base.

To support such convergence in Africa, the EU and Turkey should consider establishing structured trilateral dialogue mechanisms, such as African Union (AU)–EU–Turkey working groups. These should be focused on critical minerals governance, ESG compliance and value chain development. Structured mechanisms can also provide platforms to identify concrete areas for co-investment, capacity building or regulatory cooperation. These could be convened alongside existing summits like the Turkey–Africa Partnership Summit or the EU–AU Ministerial Meeting, enabling institutional platforms to coordinate standards and identify opportunities for joint action.

Furthermore, the EU Commission and EU member states can benefit from co-investment models. Turkey’s strong local presence and operational agility could be paired with EU financial instruments like the Global Gateway to implement infrastructure and value chain projects in African mineral hubs.

For instance, the EU and Turkey could establish a joint facility to finance mineral-linked infrastructure – such as renewable-powered mining operations or local refining plants— in African hubs, thus combining EU concessional financing with Turkish engineering capacity. Such initiatives would not only meet African infrastructure gaps but also embed both EU and Turkish actors in long-term local industrial ecosystems, rather than short-term extraction deals.

Turkish companies involved in MSP-endorsed or EU-co-funded projects should be supported in aligning with EU due diligence regulations – particularly on environmental assessments, labour conditions and local content requirements. This is feasible given that leading Turkish firms like Turkey’s largest steelmaker Erdemir and TÜMAD Mining, a subsidiary of Nurol Holding, have already signalled their willingness to adhere to higher sustainability standards.

In parallel, the EU and Turkey should consider jointly establishing an AU–EU–Turkey dialogue track on critical minerals to promote regulatory coherence and avoid fragmented standards. This mechanism could be institutionalised under the MSP framework or convened alongside existing summits, such as the Turkey–Africa Partnership Summit or the EU–AU Ministerial Meeting.

As the competition for critical minerals intensifies, strategic coordination between Turkey and the EU offers an opportunity to shift from fragmented engagements to more coherent, sustainable and mutually beneficial partnerships. If structured around shared African ownership, responsible practices and joint implementation, trilateral cooperation can provide African states with credible alternatives while advancing both Turkish and European interests in mineral security and resilient value chains.