Africa’s regional organisations and the United Nations (UN) have held a series of high-level summits to address the escalating situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which threatens . Since , this largely area has experienced a resurgence of armed groups, particularly the , which rooted in historical context. In January 2025, the M23 seized Goma, the capital of the strategically significant, and mineral-rich, North Kivu Province, with little resistance from the Congolese armed forces (FARDC), and subsequently launched a military offensive into South Kivu. The M23 has attempted to establish a and expand mineral extraction in its areas of control. This reflects the narrative of “,” which envisions extending Rwanda’s territory . The surge in violence in eastern DRC has resulted in significant loss of life and displacement and destruction of infrastructure, worsening an already critical humanitarian situation. Since 26 January 2025, over and more than , with at least from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) regional force (SAMIDRC) and the UN stabilisation mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) also killed.

Amid these dire circumstances, there is a summitry consensus on the urgent need for a peaceful resolution to the complex eastern DRC conflict. This article explores the role and strategic options of key stakeholders to stabilise eastern DRC: the UN, the African Union (AU) and its ), specifically the East African Community (EAC) and SADC.

The EAC aimed to in eastern DRC by deploying a , with troops from Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda, to eastern DRC in November 2022, notwithstanding some EAC members’ . However, tensions regarding the EACRF’s torpedoed the force. The EAC sought to use the force for efforts to facilitate the withdrawal of armed groups like the M23, while engaging in dialogue through the intermittent facilitated by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. In contrast, the Congolese government did not the EACRF’s mandate, frustrated by its inability to offensively support the FARDC against the M23 and instead sought SADC’s assistance. In response to in eastern DRC, an EAC extraordinary summit held on 29 January 2025 called on all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and hold peace talks instead, urged the Congolese government to engage in direct dialogue with the M23, and proposed a joint EAC-SADC meeting. Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi, who had previously been with the M23, did not participate in the EAC summit.

In December 2023, , comprising troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, was deployed following President Tshisekedi’s invitation. Its offensive focuses on neutralising armed groups and the protection of civilians (POC) alongside the FARDC. SAMIDRC was meant to the , facilitated by Angolan President João Lourenço since 2022, to promote political dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda. Although a ceasefire agreement was reached in August 2024, subsequent talks by December due to from the parties involved and divergence over M23’s participations, with the M23 advancing rapidly, the Luanda Process. SAMIDRC has faced logistical challenges despite support from the AU and UN and struggled to . On 31 January 2025, a in Harare, Zimbabwe, condemned the M23 and Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) aggression, reaffirmed support for SAMIDRC and the Luanda Process, and called for a ceasefire process to ensure POC and flow of humanitarian aid. The summit also endorsed the proposal for a joint EAC-SADC Summit proposal.

The AU has also made efforts to address violence in eastern DRC. In , the AU requested Angolan president João Lourenço to , initiating the Luanda Process. The AU has provided and support to SAMIDRC. Following the renewed escalation in the DRC crisis and M23’s territorial expansion, the AU Peace and Security Council on 28 January 2025. The Peace and Security Council expressed deep concerns about the risk of an open regional war, reiterated the need for M23 to disarm and withdraw, and urged reconciliation and open dialogue among the parties. The AU has recognised the need to harmonise and coordinate existing peace initiatives. Therefore, the AU Commission (AUC) convened a involving four RECs/RMs—the EAC, SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)—along with the UN in Luanda, Angola, on 27 June 2023. However, the lack of of the resulting Quadripartite Mechanism, under the auspices of the AUC has perpetuated coherence issues, ineffectiveness and violations of both the Luanda and Nairobi processes.

has supported the Congolese government in addressing security issues in eastern DRC, prioritising the POC, stabilising state institutions and supporting security reforms. MONUSCO has provided SAMIDRC with according to UN Security Council Resolution ). Despite its , MONUSCO and SAMIDRC have to curb the M23’s territorial expansion. On , the UN Security Council unanimously condemned the M23’s actions and urged an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal from occupied territories, while demanding that the RDF stop supporting the M23. This was crucial as UN Security Council members have divergent views on the role of external forces. The A3 Plus group—comprising Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Guyana—has previously opposed any , fearing it could undermine mediation efforts. The UN Security Council condemned the FARDC’s support for specific armed groups, particularly the ethnic Hutu group known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which was implicated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsis and seeks to the Rwandan government. The UN Security Council also emphasised the need for all parties to reach an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in alignment with the demands of the EAC and SADC, urging the DRC and Rwanda to recommit to the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes.

The historic held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 8 February 2025 called for an immediate ceasefire, but so far this has had little effect. The summit demanded the “lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures/disengagement of forces from the DRC,” advocating for the urgent consolidation of the Luanda and Nairobi processes. To stabilise eastern DRC effectively, the following assertive steps are imperative based on the recent flurry of high-level summitry by African regional blocs and the UN:

UN

• The UN Peacebuilding Commission, in collaboration with the AU and SADC, should assist the Congolese government to effective governance in eastern DRC that is capable of administering the territory and countering threats against civilians.

is a senior faculty member of Africa University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg and Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), South Africa. The views are those of the author and not necessarily those of affiliated institutions.